August 22, 2009
August 20, 2009
Right 'Round, Right 'Round
He’s done it again.
Walid Jumblatt has left the March 14 coalition – or maybe not.
Being the leader of the fiercely proud and historically influential Druze minority, “Walid Beik” operates to keep his community secure and his dynasty relevant. With that said, it appears that three trends have led Jumblatt to move away from the March 14 coalition.
First, the Druze leader believes the regional winds are blowing in a new direction.
At the very least, he is unsure how Saudi Arabia’s rapprochement with Syria, and America’s attempt to follow suit, will affect politics in Lebanon. Uncertainty led the chieftain to mend fences with Damascus and, when met with an immediate domestic and regional backlash, to retreat from the “Beau Rivage declaration” (fittingly, the Beau Rivage Hotel was long a center of Syrian intelligence activity in Lebanon).
Second, Jumblatt fears a conflict that would threaten his community’s fragile presence in the Levant.
A repeat of Hizbullah’s 2008 assault on Beirut and the Chouf certainly qualifies as such a hazard. While the Druze repelled the attack, the community cannot afford sustained conflict with the Shiite party, which dominates areas that surround the Druze heartland.
Jumblatt is also wary of a Sunni-Shiite conflict that could ensnare the Druze. Mistrust prevails in the wake of last year’s fighting, and a controversial Der Spiegel report linking Hizbullah officials to the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafic Hariri has only magnified the potential for strife.
Additionally, in reconciling with Hizbullah, Jumblatt may be shielding his community from internal maneuvers designed to protect supply lines and communications networks in the event of another Israel-Hizbullah war. Hizbullah’s channels, linking the Bekaa Valley with South Lebanon, traverse areas near Jumblatt’s own mountain stronghold and the party will certainly go to great lengths – as it did in May 2008 – to protect its infrastructure.
Third, Jumblatt had taken a backseat in the March 14 coalition and has acted to increase his political autonomy and influence.
Since inheriting his father’s political mantle in 2005, Future Movement leader Saad Hariri has gradually (and, at times, frustratingly) found his bearings. Quite simply, Hariri has not had to lean on Jumblatt for a while, and the latter ceased being the coalition’s driving force.
Nor was Jumblatt the coalition’s spearhead. March 14 Christians, particularly Lebanese Forces leader Samir Geagea, have increasingly assumed that role and gained Hariri’s ear over the past year. Of course, Jumblatt’s political gymnastics made his allies trust him less and decreased his sway within the movement.
In short, Jumblatt sees more value as a wild card. But what does his shift mean for others?
As it stands now, Lebanese leaders have coalesced around three alignments: a pro-Western camp; a pro-Iranian camp; and a “centrist” camp influenced by Syria. These groups are not mutually exclusive and their relationship, mirroring the regional dynamic, will ebb and flow.
The United States and Saudi Arabia will continue to back Hariri, who leads the pro-Western camp, even if their relations with Syria thaw. Similarly, Iran will continue to support and bankroll the Hizbullah-led opposition. The “centrist” bloc’s actions will presumably depend on how the Asad regime positions itself in the region.
If Syria is serious about playing a constructive role in the Middle East, the situation in Lebanon might improve. Conversely, if Syria merely aims to buy time and extract concessions from the United States, then Lebanon will pay the price.
At the local level, Jumblatt’s move may encourage opposition figures to join the pro-Syrian bloc on some issues. For instance, Marada chief Suleiman Franjieh and Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri both have an interest in opposing privatization, stalling anti-corruption measures, and crafting a pro-Syrian foreign policy.
Such a shift, if it occurs, will not diminish the March 8 bloc’s power. Most Shiites support Hizbullah, which Iran supplies and funds; and former General Michel Aoun’s Free Patriotic Movement retains much support within the Christian community.
Even so, Jumblatt’s departure is not a disaster for the March 14 movement. Whatever happens, Hariri can still count on Jumblatt’s support. Realistically, the Druze leader cannot afford to alienate Sunnis any more than Shiites. After all, Sunnis are a dominant majority in the Middle East and Jumblatt’s own electoral survival depends on good relations with Sunnis in the Chouf.
Moreover, Hariri’s Future Movement may move closer to the Lebanese Forces and Phalange, at least in the near term. These parties embrace Lebanon’s liberal economic tradition, oppose Syrian interference in Lebanon, and are comfortable in calling for serious talks on Hizbullah’s arms. Though smaller, the surviving coalition is more cohesive than its predecessor.
As always, the Beik fascinates and exasperates. An opportunist with a flair for making extravagant and contradictory declarations, the man is neither consistent nor accountable.
In some regard, however, he must be thanked. Unabashedly committed to his own survival, and that of his community, Walid Jumblatt has revealed – once more – the truth at the heart of politics in Lebanon.
Walid Jumblatt has left the March 14 coalition – or maybe not.
Being the leader of the fiercely proud and historically influential Druze minority, “Walid Beik” operates to keep his community secure and his dynasty relevant. With that said, it appears that three trends have led Jumblatt to move away from the March 14 coalition.
First, the Druze leader believes the regional winds are blowing in a new direction.
At the very least, he is unsure how Saudi Arabia’s rapprochement with Syria, and America’s attempt to follow suit, will affect politics in Lebanon. Uncertainty led the chieftain to mend fences with Damascus and, when met with an immediate domestic and regional backlash, to retreat from the “Beau Rivage declaration” (fittingly, the Beau Rivage Hotel was long a center of Syrian intelligence activity in Lebanon).
Second, Jumblatt fears a conflict that would threaten his community’s fragile presence in the Levant.
A repeat of Hizbullah’s 2008 assault on Beirut and the Chouf certainly qualifies as such a hazard. While the Druze repelled the attack, the community cannot afford sustained conflict with the Shiite party, which dominates areas that surround the Druze heartland.
Jumblatt is also wary of a Sunni-Shiite conflict that could ensnare the Druze. Mistrust prevails in the wake of last year’s fighting, and a controversial Der Spiegel report linking Hizbullah officials to the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafic Hariri has only magnified the potential for strife.
Additionally, in reconciling with Hizbullah, Jumblatt may be shielding his community from internal maneuvers designed to protect supply lines and communications networks in the event of another Israel-Hizbullah war. Hizbullah’s channels, linking the Bekaa Valley with South Lebanon, traverse areas near Jumblatt’s own mountain stronghold and the party will certainly go to great lengths – as it did in May 2008 – to protect its infrastructure.
Third, Jumblatt had taken a backseat in the March 14 coalition and has acted to increase his political autonomy and influence.
Since inheriting his father’s political mantle in 2005, Future Movement leader Saad Hariri has gradually (and, at times, frustratingly) found his bearings. Quite simply, Hariri has not had to lean on Jumblatt for a while, and the latter ceased being the coalition’s driving force.
Nor was Jumblatt the coalition’s spearhead. March 14 Christians, particularly Lebanese Forces leader Samir Geagea, have increasingly assumed that role and gained Hariri’s ear over the past year. Of course, Jumblatt’s political gymnastics made his allies trust him less and decreased his sway within the movement.
In short, Jumblatt sees more value as a wild card. But what does his shift mean for others?
As it stands now, Lebanese leaders have coalesced around three alignments: a pro-Western camp; a pro-Iranian camp; and a “centrist” camp influenced by Syria. These groups are not mutually exclusive and their relationship, mirroring the regional dynamic, will ebb and flow.
The United States and Saudi Arabia will continue to back Hariri, who leads the pro-Western camp, even if their relations with Syria thaw. Similarly, Iran will continue to support and bankroll the Hizbullah-led opposition. The “centrist” bloc’s actions will presumably depend on how the Asad regime positions itself in the region.
If Syria is serious about playing a constructive role in the Middle East, the situation in Lebanon might improve. Conversely, if Syria merely aims to buy time and extract concessions from the United States, then Lebanon will pay the price.
At the local level, Jumblatt’s move may encourage opposition figures to join the pro-Syrian bloc on some issues. For instance, Marada chief Suleiman Franjieh and Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri both have an interest in opposing privatization, stalling anti-corruption measures, and crafting a pro-Syrian foreign policy.
Such a shift, if it occurs, will not diminish the March 8 bloc’s power. Most Shiites support Hizbullah, which Iran supplies and funds; and former General Michel Aoun’s Free Patriotic Movement retains much support within the Christian community.
Even so, Jumblatt’s departure is not a disaster for the March 14 movement. Whatever happens, Hariri can still count on Jumblatt’s support. Realistically, the Druze leader cannot afford to alienate Sunnis any more than Shiites. After all, Sunnis are a dominant majority in the Middle East and Jumblatt’s own electoral survival depends on good relations with Sunnis in the Chouf.
Moreover, Hariri’s Future Movement may move closer to the Lebanese Forces and Phalange, at least in the near term. These parties embrace Lebanon’s liberal economic tradition, oppose Syrian interference in Lebanon, and are comfortable in calling for serious talks on Hizbullah’s arms. Though smaller, the surviving coalition is more cohesive than its predecessor.
As always, the Beik fascinates and exasperates. An opportunist with a flair for making extravagant and contradictory declarations, the man is neither consistent nor accountable.
In some regard, however, he must be thanked. Unabashedly committed to his own survival, and that of his community, Walid Jumblatt has revealed – once more – the truth at the heart of politics in Lebanon.
July 7, 2009
Daily Star Opinion Piece: Help Lebanon, Help Mideast Democracy
Please read this opinion article that I coauthored with a colleague at George Washington University Law School. The piece deals with U.S. assistance to Lebanon.
June 19, 2009
A Thorn Among Roses: Christian Disarray in Lebanon
Christian Concerns
"Three things matter to the Christians of Lebanon, and those of Zahle in particular: the Presidency, the Lebanese Armed Forces [LAF], and the Church," said Okab Sakr, a Shiite MP from the Zahle district, during a Thursday airing of Kalam al-Nass. These words are as true as ever, but the Christian community seems hell-bent on undermining the last pillars of its significance.
The Presidency
The President of the Republic is traditionally a Maronite Christian. Although the Taif Accord that ended the Lebanese Civil War transferred most executive power from the presidency to the Cabinet (headed by a Sunni Prime Minister), the president retains considerable esteem as the "head of state and the symbol of the nation's unity."
As modified by the Taif Amendments, the Constitution states that the president "shall safeguard the constitution and Lebanon's independence, unity, and territorial integrity." As a Christian leader, the president also retains influence grounded in the communal nature of Lebanese politics.
All in all, the presidency is imbued with a great deal of symbolic importance and a potential for great influence over politics in Lebanon. But translating potential into effectiveness requires communal support - in the form of a parliamentary coalition or a share in cabinet - for the president.
Over the past two decades Christian bickering has stripped the presidency of such support. In the 1990s, Syria exploited intra-Christian and inter-communal divisions to install two docile presidents. From 2005 until 2008, Christian political leaders failed to reach a consensus on who would replace the inept President Emile Lahoud. Discord led to a six-month-long presidential vaccuum and allowed other local and regional players to determine the course of the presidency.
President Michel Suleiman, former commander of the LAF, has not been able (he may not be willing, either) to carve out an autonomous popular base for himself. With no parliamentary coalition aligned with him, Suleiman will need to retain a 'swing bloc' of cabinet ministers if he is to play the role of internal arbiter envisioned in the Taif Accord. Unfortunately, the consensus president has come under attack.
Leading the charge is Free Patriotic Movement leader and former General Michel Aoun. After the 2005 parliamentary elections, Aoun found himself at the head of a coalition of 22 lawmakers. Other Christian figures like Lebanese Forces leader Samir Geagea and Phalange boss and former President Amin Gemayel did not want to see Aoun ascend to the presidency, especially because of his alliance with Hizbullah. The March 14 Sunni and Druze factions also feared or resented Aoun, and preferred a presidential void to Aoun as president.
For his part, Aoun allowed his lust for the power to cloud his political vision: rather than act as kingmaker and facilitate the election of a consensus president, Aoun clung to his delusions. Like his Christian counterparts in the March 14 coalition, Aoun eventually saw himself sidelined within his political alliance when Hizbullah's interests favored electing a consensus president. The President was delivered over the heads of rival Christian factions.
Thus, despite his best efforts, Sleiman lacks institutional or popular bases for playing an effective role in the country.
A March 14 victory at the polls has only thrown the president's role into question. First, the March 14-March 8 divide polarized the elections and prevented a third bloc from emerging in support of Sleiman. Second, the March 14 victory means that the international community will not have to engage with the president as an alternative to a Hizbullah-led cabinet.
Of course, the president commands the respect of the army and has increasingly turned to the United States to strengthen the state institutions that he embodies. Strangely enough, a Lebanese President lacking an autonomous Christian base has strong support from the international community and Lebanese Muslims. Negotiations over the next cabinet will determine to what extent Sleiman can use this support to bolster his domestic role, but the presidency remains relatively marginalized within the Christian community for now, and this in turn has marginalized the community in Lebanon's system.
The Lebanese Armed Forces
The commander of the Lebanese Armed Forces is also traditionally Maronite, although decisions of war and peace do not rest with either with the commander or the president (the cabinet, collectively, must decide such matters).
The army is the most compelling example of cross-communal national unity in Lebanon. The institution draws members from all sects and regions, and Lebanon's various political bosses - despite several moments of dissatisfaction with particular actions - have yet to openly challenge its role in Lebanon since the withdrawal of Syrian troops in 2005.
Within the Christian community, the army receives almost exalted treatment. As a national institution, the LAF stands as a symbol the state of Lebanon, the "final homeland for all its citizens." On the other hand, as an institution commanded by a Christian, the LAF symbolizes the "enduring presence of Christians in Lebanon."
In doing so, the LAF somehow manages to satisfy two traditional - and sometimes conflicting - currents of Christian political thought: the narrow Christian desire for relevance in Lebanese political life and the broader Christian ambition of a Lebanese nation-state set apart from the region.
Brigadier-General Jean Kahwaji has replaced Suleiman as LAF commander, and has moved to preserve the international relationships built by Suleiman and Defense Minister Elias Murr, while attempting to retain the military's trust that Suleiman earned as a commander not too prone to either Western or Syrian interference.
Seeking training and material support from the West while maintaining a nationalist posture is a delicate task, but the LAF and its command staff have thus far managed to walk that line. As of yet, the LAF is a strong source of Christian unity and of Lebanese national sentiment.
Fortunately, no Christian leader appears set to consciously derail progress on this front. Unfortunately, political division continues to shackle the LAF's ability to make progress on strategic and operational fronts. Lacking a comprehensive defense policy or any sort of political cohesion regarding threats to the state, Lebanese military commanders have refrained from developing a strategic vision or tactical implementation.
The Christian rift in Lebanon has, on the one hand, weakened decision-making in the cabinet and, on the other hand, lent cross-communal support for Hizbullah. The consequences of this domestic division will continue to hold back the LAF, irrespective of international efforts to support the army's capabilities.
The Church
The Maronite Church is a Uniate Church, which means that the it is Catholic with regard to dogma and follows the Vatican, but retains an Eastern Syriac (Aramaic) liturgy and some institutional autonomy. The Maronite Patriarch is actually elected by a Conclave of Maronite Bishops and is "recognized" - rather than "appointed" - by the Pope.
The Church has played an important role in the history of Mount Lebanon and, since 1920, the successor Grand Liban and Republic of Lebanon. The Church was active in establishing an autonomous Lebanese state; nurturing "Lebanism" (Lebanese nationalism, rather than pan-Syrianism or Arabism) since the mid-19th century, and in expressing Lebanese Christian concerns in the absence of effective political leadership.
During the aftermath of the Lebanese Civil War in 1990, with Free Patriotic Movement leader General Michel Aoun in exile and Lebanese Forces chief Samir Geagea imprisoned, Maronite Patriarch Nasrallah Butros Sfeir led domestic opposition to Syria's post-war occupation of Lebanon. Other Lebanese figures and factions - particularly Hizbullah - have criticized the Patriarch for not adopting a more hostile stance towards Israel's of South Lebanon, which ended in 2000.
Nevertheless, the Patriarch commands the respect of broad swathes of Lebanese society, and stands as a symbol of the Christian conscience. After the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafic Hariri triggered mass demonstrations calling for Syria's withdrawal from Lebanon, the Patriarch's stances have seemed congruent with the March 14 coalition.
Most recently, Sfeir has come under fire from Nasrallah and Aoun for issuing an election-eve statement cautioning the Lebanese against "mistakes" that would likely ensue in the event of a Hizbullah victory, which would threaten "Lebanon's existence and its Arab identity."
Anyone - a patriarch, priest, or pundit - who makes a political statement should be ready to accept the reactions and criticisms of others. Furthermore, the Patriarch must be careful not to further alienate Aoun and Marada Movement leader Suleiman Franjieh, as they will be necessary to any intra-Christian reconciliation.
That being said, few religious clerics in Lebanon are subject to the same criticism from within or without their communities. For example, Ayatollah Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah does not draw the same ire for his relatively moderate stances regarding politics, society in Lebanon, or the role and rights of women.
More relevantly, Sayyed Nasrallah himself seems to be above criticism. For example, two years ago, Hizbullah supporters took to the streets to voice their rage at a satire show's depiction of Nasrallah. The Sayyed then announced to the rest of the Lebanese that, in Lebanon's pluralistic framework, people must be aware that "certain communities and cultures do not accept what others view as permissible."
A religious cleric who heads an Islamist party may thus use his cloak to place himself above questioning, while a Catholic cardinal and Patriarch must answer to others for his political commentary. This is not to say that the Patriarch should be immune from criticism (all individuals should bear the consequences of their speech and actions), but only to highlight the double standard that applies to Hizbullah.
Nevertheless, the fault here is not Hizbullah's. Other communities have shielded their religious leaders from mudslinging, but Christian politicians more readily criticize and even attack their own. In some regards, this is healthy: members of the Christian community can and often readily disagree with political leaders, spiritual guides, and each other. In the communal game, however, pluralism often leads to counterproductive fragmentation. A proper balance between criticism and respect is simply lacking in the Christian community.
Thorn Among Roses
In 1510, Pope Leo X addressed a papal bull to the Maronite Patriarch, Peter of Hadath, and described the Maronites as a "rose among thorns." Divided amongst themselves despite common trials and tribulations, Christians continue to leverage and undermine the presidency and patriarchate whilst bemoaning the "communal immunity" of their Lebanese counterparts. Alas, the Christians of Lebanon seem determined to become thorns among roses.
"Three things matter to the Christians of Lebanon, and those of Zahle in particular: the Presidency, the Lebanese Armed Forces [LAF], and the Church," said Okab Sakr, a Shiite MP from the Zahle district, during a Thursday airing of Kalam al-Nass. These words are as true as ever, but the Christian community seems hell-bent on undermining the last pillars of its significance.
The Presidency
The President of the Republic is traditionally a Maronite Christian. Although the Taif Accord that ended the Lebanese Civil War transferred most executive power from the presidency to the Cabinet (headed by a Sunni Prime Minister), the president retains considerable esteem as the "head of state and the symbol of the nation's unity."
As modified by the Taif Amendments, the Constitution states that the president "shall safeguard the constitution and Lebanon's independence, unity, and territorial integrity." As a Christian leader, the president also retains influence grounded in the communal nature of Lebanese politics.
All in all, the presidency is imbued with a great deal of symbolic importance and a potential for great influence over politics in Lebanon. But translating potential into effectiveness requires communal support - in the form of a parliamentary coalition or a share in cabinet - for the president.
Over the past two decades Christian bickering has stripped the presidency of such support. In the 1990s, Syria exploited intra-Christian and inter-communal divisions to install two docile presidents. From 2005 until 2008, Christian political leaders failed to reach a consensus on who would replace the inept President Emile Lahoud. Discord led to a six-month-long presidential vaccuum and allowed other local and regional players to determine the course of the presidency.
President Michel Suleiman, former commander of the LAF, has not been able (he may not be willing, either) to carve out an autonomous popular base for himself. With no parliamentary coalition aligned with him, Suleiman will need to retain a 'swing bloc' of cabinet ministers if he is to play the role of internal arbiter envisioned in the Taif Accord. Unfortunately, the consensus president has come under attack.
Leading the charge is Free Patriotic Movement leader and former General Michel Aoun. After the 2005 parliamentary elections, Aoun found himself at the head of a coalition of 22 lawmakers. Other Christian figures like Lebanese Forces leader Samir Geagea and Phalange boss and former President Amin Gemayel did not want to see Aoun ascend to the presidency, especially because of his alliance with Hizbullah. The March 14 Sunni and Druze factions also feared or resented Aoun, and preferred a presidential void to Aoun as president.
For his part, Aoun allowed his lust for the power to cloud his political vision: rather than act as kingmaker and facilitate the election of a consensus president, Aoun clung to his delusions. Like his Christian counterparts in the March 14 coalition, Aoun eventually saw himself sidelined within his political alliance when Hizbullah's interests favored electing a consensus president. The President was delivered over the heads of rival Christian factions.
Thus, despite his best efforts, Sleiman lacks institutional or popular bases for playing an effective role in the country.
A March 14 victory at the polls has only thrown the president's role into question. First, the March 14-March 8 divide polarized the elections and prevented a third bloc from emerging in support of Sleiman. Second, the March 14 victory means that the international community will not have to engage with the president as an alternative to a Hizbullah-led cabinet.
Of course, the president commands the respect of the army and has increasingly turned to the United States to strengthen the state institutions that he embodies. Strangely enough, a Lebanese President lacking an autonomous Christian base has strong support from the international community and Lebanese Muslims. Negotiations over the next cabinet will determine to what extent Sleiman can use this support to bolster his domestic role, but the presidency remains relatively marginalized within the Christian community for now, and this in turn has marginalized the community in Lebanon's system.
The Lebanese Armed Forces
The commander of the Lebanese Armed Forces is also traditionally Maronite, although decisions of war and peace do not rest with either with the commander or the president (the cabinet, collectively, must decide such matters).
The army is the most compelling example of cross-communal national unity in Lebanon. The institution draws members from all sects and regions, and Lebanon's various political bosses - despite several moments of dissatisfaction with particular actions - have yet to openly challenge its role in Lebanon since the withdrawal of Syrian troops in 2005.
Within the Christian community, the army receives almost exalted treatment. As a national institution, the LAF stands as a symbol the state of Lebanon, the "final homeland for all its citizens." On the other hand, as an institution commanded by a Christian, the LAF symbolizes the "enduring presence of Christians in Lebanon."
In doing so, the LAF somehow manages to satisfy two traditional - and sometimes conflicting - currents of Christian political thought: the narrow Christian desire for relevance in Lebanese political life and the broader Christian ambition of a Lebanese nation-state set apart from the region.
Brigadier-General Jean Kahwaji has replaced Suleiman as LAF commander, and has moved to preserve the international relationships built by Suleiman and Defense Minister Elias Murr, while attempting to retain the military's trust that Suleiman earned as a commander not too prone to either Western or Syrian interference.
Seeking training and material support from the West while maintaining a nationalist posture is a delicate task, but the LAF and its command staff have thus far managed to walk that line. As of yet, the LAF is a strong source of Christian unity and of Lebanese national sentiment.
Fortunately, no Christian leader appears set to consciously derail progress on this front. Unfortunately, political division continues to shackle the LAF's ability to make progress on strategic and operational fronts. Lacking a comprehensive defense policy or any sort of political cohesion regarding threats to the state, Lebanese military commanders have refrained from developing a strategic vision or tactical implementation.
The Christian rift in Lebanon has, on the one hand, weakened decision-making in the cabinet and, on the other hand, lent cross-communal support for Hizbullah. The consequences of this domestic division will continue to hold back the LAF, irrespective of international efforts to support the army's capabilities.
The Church
The Maronite Church is a Uniate Church, which means that the it is Catholic with regard to dogma and follows the Vatican, but retains an Eastern Syriac (Aramaic) liturgy and some institutional autonomy. The Maronite Patriarch is actually elected by a Conclave of Maronite Bishops and is "recognized" - rather than "appointed" - by the Pope.
The Church has played an important role in the history of Mount Lebanon and, since 1920, the successor Grand Liban and Republic of Lebanon. The Church was active in establishing an autonomous Lebanese state; nurturing "Lebanism" (Lebanese nationalism, rather than pan-Syrianism or Arabism) since the mid-19th century, and in expressing Lebanese Christian concerns in the absence of effective political leadership.
During the aftermath of the Lebanese Civil War in 1990, with Free Patriotic Movement leader General Michel Aoun in exile and Lebanese Forces chief Samir Geagea imprisoned, Maronite Patriarch Nasrallah Butros Sfeir led domestic opposition to Syria's post-war occupation of Lebanon. Other Lebanese figures and factions - particularly Hizbullah - have criticized the Patriarch for not adopting a more hostile stance towards Israel's of South Lebanon, which ended in 2000.
Nevertheless, the Patriarch commands the respect of broad swathes of Lebanese society, and stands as a symbol of the Christian conscience. After the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafic Hariri triggered mass demonstrations calling for Syria's withdrawal from Lebanon, the Patriarch's stances have seemed congruent with the March 14 coalition.
Most recently, Sfeir has come under fire from Nasrallah and Aoun for issuing an election-eve statement cautioning the Lebanese against "mistakes" that would likely ensue in the event of a Hizbullah victory, which would threaten "Lebanon's existence and its Arab identity."
Anyone - a patriarch, priest, or pundit - who makes a political statement should be ready to accept the reactions and criticisms of others. Furthermore, the Patriarch must be careful not to further alienate Aoun and Marada Movement leader Suleiman Franjieh, as they will be necessary to any intra-Christian reconciliation.
That being said, few religious clerics in Lebanon are subject to the same criticism from within or without their communities. For example, Ayatollah Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah does not draw the same ire for his relatively moderate stances regarding politics, society in Lebanon, or the role and rights of women.
More relevantly, Sayyed Nasrallah himself seems to be above criticism. For example, two years ago, Hizbullah supporters took to the streets to voice their rage at a satire show's depiction of Nasrallah. The Sayyed then announced to the rest of the Lebanese that, in Lebanon's pluralistic framework, people must be aware that "certain communities and cultures do not accept what others view as permissible."
A religious cleric who heads an Islamist party may thus use his cloak to place himself above questioning, while a Catholic cardinal and Patriarch must answer to others for his political commentary. This is not to say that the Patriarch should be immune from criticism (all individuals should bear the consequences of their speech and actions), but only to highlight the double standard that applies to Hizbullah.
Nevertheless, the fault here is not Hizbullah's. Other communities have shielded their religious leaders from mudslinging, but Christian politicians more readily criticize and even attack their own. In some regards, this is healthy: members of the Christian community can and often readily disagree with political leaders, spiritual guides, and each other. In the communal game, however, pluralism often leads to counterproductive fragmentation. A proper balance between criticism and respect is simply lacking in the Christian community.
Thorn Among Roses
In 1510, Pope Leo X addressed a papal bull to the Maronite Patriarch, Peter of Hadath, and described the Maronites as a "rose among thorns." Divided amongst themselves despite common trials and tribulations, Christians continue to leverage and undermine the presidency and patriarchate whilst bemoaning the "communal immunity" of their Lebanese counterparts. Alas, the Christians of Lebanon seem determined to become thorns among roses.
June 9, 2009
Silencing the Alarmists: Why The Conventional Wisdom Was Wrong
Lebanon's elections have surprised many observers. Few expected a victory by the March 14 coalition, and fewer still anticipated an expanded parliamentary majority. Despite a conventional wisdom that all but conceded a Hizbullah-led opposition victory, a group of Washington-based Lebanon analysts predicted a 'March 14' victory in successive analyses conducted over a two-month period leading up to the elections. Although each prediction run yielded different results (ranging from 64 'March 14' seats to 67 'March 14' seats), all signs pointed to a slight victory by the Western-backed coalition.
But confidence was low. The electoral law agreed upon in last year's Doha Accord clearly favored the 'March 8' opposition bloc. Indeed, Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) leader and former General Michel Aoun had repeatedly lauded his push for the law as a liberation of the 'Christian voice.'
Additionally, Hizbullah, Amal, the FPM, and the Tashnag had done a far better job of coordinating their electoral machines and in putting together candidacy lists (the sole exception was Jezzine, but the opposition was certain to capture the district regardless of whether the FPM and Amal were able to consolidate their competing lists).
The March 14 coalition also failed to effectively fly expatriate voters into Lebanon. Although it appears that both camps managed to arrange an influx of voters to accompany the regular turnout of 'political tourists,' a dispute between the Lebanese Forces and the Future Movement over the Armenian seat in the Beirut I district apparently scuttled plans for a harmonized pro-government campaign to bring the diaspora vote home.
Finally, even the policy community in Washington and Western-leaning analysts in Beirut agreed with their counterparts in Damascus, Tehran, and Tel Aviv that Lebanon would tilt towards the opposition. Of course, Lebanon's pluralism generally prevents drastic shifts in one direction or the other, but the broader regional trend seemingly pointed to a Hizbullah-FPM victory.
With Hamas in the Palestinian territories, the radical Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in Tehran, and a right-wing coalition in Israel, there was little hope for a coalition amiable to the West.
With pressing matters at home, argued rejectionists in Lebanon and Syria, the United States would soon withdraw its support for allies in the region and recede from overt involvement in the Middle East, as it had done decades earlier. As such, it would be prudent to align with Syria and Iran.
In Washington, alarmists argued that the rising tide of extremism would swallow Lebanon, particularly since Hizbullah humiliated the March 14 coalition in street battles last May and exposed the limits of American support.
While not false, these lines of reasoning missed the point. The communal fundamentals of Lebanese politics indicated that March 14 would capture seats in Koura, Metn, and Zahle (though nobody expected a sweep of Zahle's seven seats); the overall frustration of Lebanon's Christian conscience; and Hizbullah's tenuous domestic position, were key factors neglected by observers predicting a March 8 win.
In the grand scheme of things, not much has changed. Lebanon remains divided, the regional situation remains uncertain, and Hizbullah is still armed. Still, the alarmists were wrong about the election results. What remains to be seen is whether Lebanon has stemmed the expansion of Syrian and Iranian influence in a manner that will compell Damascus and Tehran to reassess and reengage.
But confidence was low. The electoral law agreed upon in last year's Doha Accord clearly favored the 'March 8' opposition bloc. Indeed, Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) leader and former General Michel Aoun had repeatedly lauded his push for the law as a liberation of the 'Christian voice.'
Additionally, Hizbullah, Amal, the FPM, and the Tashnag had done a far better job of coordinating their electoral machines and in putting together candidacy lists (the sole exception was Jezzine, but the opposition was certain to capture the district regardless of whether the FPM and Amal were able to consolidate their competing lists).
The March 14 coalition also failed to effectively fly expatriate voters into Lebanon. Although it appears that both camps managed to arrange an influx of voters to accompany the regular turnout of 'political tourists,' a dispute between the Lebanese Forces and the Future Movement over the Armenian seat in the Beirut I district apparently scuttled plans for a harmonized pro-government campaign to bring the diaspora vote home.
Finally, even the policy community in Washington and Western-leaning analysts in Beirut agreed with their counterparts in Damascus, Tehran, and Tel Aviv that Lebanon would tilt towards the opposition. Of course, Lebanon's pluralism generally prevents drastic shifts in one direction or the other, but the broader regional trend seemingly pointed to a Hizbullah-FPM victory.
With Hamas in the Palestinian territories, the radical Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in Tehran, and a right-wing coalition in Israel, there was little hope for a coalition amiable to the West.
With pressing matters at home, argued rejectionists in Lebanon and Syria, the United States would soon withdraw its support for allies in the region and recede from overt involvement in the Middle East, as it had done decades earlier. As such, it would be prudent to align with Syria and Iran.
In Washington, alarmists argued that the rising tide of extremism would swallow Lebanon, particularly since Hizbullah humiliated the March 14 coalition in street battles last May and exposed the limits of American support.
While not false, these lines of reasoning missed the point. The communal fundamentals of Lebanese politics indicated that March 14 would capture seats in Koura, Metn, and Zahle (though nobody expected a sweep of Zahle's seven seats); the overall frustration of Lebanon's Christian conscience; and Hizbullah's tenuous domestic position, were key factors neglected by observers predicting a March 8 win.
In the grand scheme of things, not much has changed. Lebanon remains divided, the regional situation remains uncertain, and Hizbullah is still armed. Still, the alarmists were wrong about the election results. What remains to be seen is whether Lebanon has stemmed the expansion of Syrian and Iranian influence in a manner that will compell Damascus and Tehran to reassess and reengage.
May 31, 2009
The Danger of Microphones: Empowering the Insane and Theatrical
"Stability in Lebanon should never be taken for granted," concludes a recent article on Lebanon in The Economist. Though the respected British weekly eloquently states the obvious - that the Lebanese state of affairs is as precarious as ever - Lebanon's rival factions continue to trade jabs over everything from political vision to the proper pronunciation of their respective names.
The venomous political discourse is not new, but this is precisely the problem: the Lebanese have become accustomed to vitriol - many even delight in it - and have failed themselves by not demanding more restraint from their leaders. In a recent interview on Kalam al-Nass, an influential political talk show, Walid Jumblatt said the following:
Of course, international and regional political considerations have contributed greatly to the instability in Lebanon. Because of its pluralistic society, Lebanon has long been open to the interests of other actors.
Nevertheless, the Lebanese political class has been a willing bedfellow, and its respective members have continued to leverage the interests of international patrons against their domestic rivals - such games are not new to Lebanon.
The Lebanese have yet to tire of their leaders, who are fighting for scraps in a country smaller than Connecticut while expecting the rest of the world to make Lebanon the linchpin of the international system. In all likelihood, the Lebanese have not tired because communal insecurity is a powerful incentive to lend unflinching support to one faction or another.
Yet, neither communal insecurity nor the system it has enshrined necessitates irresponsible leadership. Over the past few years, millions have taken to the streets in Lebanon. Peaceful, spontaneous protests have gradually made way to staged rallies, political posturing, and an incessant war of words that borders on the insane.
It should be stressed that the freedom of expression and freedom of assembly positively set Lebanon apart from many other countries in the region. It should also be stressed that the Syrian regime often stoked fears of instability in Lebanon to justify maintaining control over the country.
But, as the cliche goes, rights come with responsibilities. It is one thing to embrace honest, hard-fought political debate. It is quite another to accept reckless rhetoric that risks unleashing forces beyond the control of even the most capable of men.
The venomous political discourse is not new, but this is precisely the problem: the Lebanese have become accustomed to vitriol - many even delight in it - and have failed themselves by not demanding more restraint from their leaders. In a recent interview on Kalam al-Nass, an influential political talk show, Walid Jumblatt said the following:
"Do you know what the most dangerous weapon is? Along with nuclear weapons, microphones are the most dangerous of all. People - particularly in our East [that is, the Middle East] - throw caution to the wind when speaking in front of a microphone, as they play to their host or their audience."Coming from Jumblatt, a controversial figure who has often spoken and acted recklessly, this statement contains a powerful truth despite - or perhaps because of - its messenger: since the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafic Hariri, particularly since the July 2006 War completely exposed the fundamental differences within Lebanese society, careless words and irresponsible political acts have pushed Lebanon to the brink of another civil war time and again.
Of course, international and regional political considerations have contributed greatly to the instability in Lebanon. Because of its pluralistic society, Lebanon has long been open to the interests of other actors.
Nevertheless, the Lebanese political class has been a willing bedfellow, and its respective members have continued to leverage the interests of international patrons against their domestic rivals - such games are not new to Lebanon.
The Lebanese have yet to tire of their leaders, who are fighting for scraps in a country smaller than Connecticut while expecting the rest of the world to make Lebanon the linchpin of the international system. In all likelihood, the Lebanese have not tired because communal insecurity is a powerful incentive to lend unflinching support to one faction or another.
Yet, neither communal insecurity nor the system it has enshrined necessitates irresponsible leadership. Over the past few years, millions have taken to the streets in Lebanon. Peaceful, spontaneous protests have gradually made way to staged rallies, political posturing, and an incessant war of words that borders on the insane.
It should be stressed that the freedom of expression and freedom of assembly positively set Lebanon apart from many other countries in the region. It should also be stressed that the Syrian regime often stoked fears of instability in Lebanon to justify maintaining control over the country.
But, as the cliche goes, rights come with responsibilities. It is one thing to embrace honest, hard-fought political debate. It is quite another to accept reckless rhetoric that risks unleashing forces beyond the control of even the most capable of men.
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