August 22, 2009
August 20, 2009
Right 'Round, Right 'Round
He’s done it again.
Walid Jumblatt has left the March 14 coalition – or maybe not.
Being the leader of the fiercely proud and historically influential Druze minority, “Walid Beik” operates to keep his community secure and his dynasty relevant. With that said, it appears that three trends have led Jumblatt to move away from the March 14 coalition.
First, the Druze leader believes the regional winds are blowing in a new direction.
At the very least, he is unsure how Saudi Arabia’s rapprochement with Syria, and America’s attempt to follow suit, will affect politics in Lebanon. Uncertainty led the chieftain to mend fences with Damascus and, when met with an immediate domestic and regional backlash, to retreat from the “Beau Rivage declaration” (fittingly, the Beau Rivage Hotel was long a center of Syrian intelligence activity in Lebanon).
Second, Jumblatt fears a conflict that would threaten his community’s fragile presence in the Levant.
A repeat of Hizbullah’s 2008 assault on Beirut and the Chouf certainly qualifies as such a hazard. While the Druze repelled the attack, the community cannot afford sustained conflict with the Shiite party, which dominates areas that surround the Druze heartland.
Jumblatt is also wary of a Sunni-Shiite conflict that could ensnare the Druze. Mistrust prevails in the wake of last year’s fighting, and a controversial Der Spiegel report linking Hizbullah officials to the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafic Hariri has only magnified the potential for strife.
Additionally, in reconciling with Hizbullah, Jumblatt may be shielding his community from internal maneuvers designed to protect supply lines and communications networks in the event of another Israel-Hizbullah war. Hizbullah’s channels, linking the Bekaa Valley with South Lebanon, traverse areas near Jumblatt’s own mountain stronghold and the party will certainly go to great lengths – as it did in May 2008 – to protect its infrastructure.
Third, Jumblatt had taken a backseat in the March 14 coalition and has acted to increase his political autonomy and influence.
Since inheriting his father’s political mantle in 2005, Future Movement leader Saad Hariri has gradually (and, at times, frustratingly) found his bearings. Quite simply, Hariri has not had to lean on Jumblatt for a while, and the latter ceased being the coalition’s driving force.
Nor was Jumblatt the coalition’s spearhead. March 14 Christians, particularly Lebanese Forces leader Samir Geagea, have increasingly assumed that role and gained Hariri’s ear over the past year. Of course, Jumblatt’s political gymnastics made his allies trust him less and decreased his sway within the movement.
In short, Jumblatt sees more value as a wild card. But what does his shift mean for others?
As it stands now, Lebanese leaders have coalesced around three alignments: a pro-Western camp; a pro-Iranian camp; and a “centrist” camp influenced by Syria. These groups are not mutually exclusive and their relationship, mirroring the regional dynamic, will ebb and flow.
The United States and Saudi Arabia will continue to back Hariri, who leads the pro-Western camp, even if their relations with Syria thaw. Similarly, Iran will continue to support and bankroll the Hizbullah-led opposition. The “centrist” bloc’s actions will presumably depend on how the Asad regime positions itself in the region.
If Syria is serious about playing a constructive role in the Middle East, the situation in Lebanon might improve. Conversely, if Syria merely aims to buy time and extract concessions from the United States, then Lebanon will pay the price.
At the local level, Jumblatt’s move may encourage opposition figures to join the pro-Syrian bloc on some issues. For instance, Marada chief Suleiman Franjieh and Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri both have an interest in opposing privatization, stalling anti-corruption measures, and crafting a pro-Syrian foreign policy.
Such a shift, if it occurs, will not diminish the March 8 bloc’s power. Most Shiites support Hizbullah, which Iran supplies and funds; and former General Michel Aoun’s Free Patriotic Movement retains much support within the Christian community.
Even so, Jumblatt’s departure is not a disaster for the March 14 movement. Whatever happens, Hariri can still count on Jumblatt’s support. Realistically, the Druze leader cannot afford to alienate Sunnis any more than Shiites. After all, Sunnis are a dominant majority in the Middle East and Jumblatt’s own electoral survival depends on good relations with Sunnis in the Chouf.
Moreover, Hariri’s Future Movement may move closer to the Lebanese Forces and Phalange, at least in the near term. These parties embrace Lebanon’s liberal economic tradition, oppose Syrian interference in Lebanon, and are comfortable in calling for serious talks on Hizbullah’s arms. Though smaller, the surviving coalition is more cohesive than its predecessor.
As always, the Beik fascinates and exasperates. An opportunist with a flair for making extravagant and contradictory declarations, the man is neither consistent nor accountable.
In some regard, however, he must be thanked. Unabashedly committed to his own survival, and that of his community, Walid Jumblatt has revealed – once more – the truth at the heart of politics in Lebanon.
Walid Jumblatt has left the March 14 coalition – or maybe not.
Being the leader of the fiercely proud and historically influential Druze minority, “Walid Beik” operates to keep his community secure and his dynasty relevant. With that said, it appears that three trends have led Jumblatt to move away from the March 14 coalition.
First, the Druze leader believes the regional winds are blowing in a new direction.
At the very least, he is unsure how Saudi Arabia’s rapprochement with Syria, and America’s attempt to follow suit, will affect politics in Lebanon. Uncertainty led the chieftain to mend fences with Damascus and, when met with an immediate domestic and regional backlash, to retreat from the “Beau Rivage declaration” (fittingly, the Beau Rivage Hotel was long a center of Syrian intelligence activity in Lebanon).
Second, Jumblatt fears a conflict that would threaten his community’s fragile presence in the Levant.
A repeat of Hizbullah’s 2008 assault on Beirut and the Chouf certainly qualifies as such a hazard. While the Druze repelled the attack, the community cannot afford sustained conflict with the Shiite party, which dominates areas that surround the Druze heartland.
Jumblatt is also wary of a Sunni-Shiite conflict that could ensnare the Druze. Mistrust prevails in the wake of last year’s fighting, and a controversial Der Spiegel report linking Hizbullah officials to the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafic Hariri has only magnified the potential for strife.
Additionally, in reconciling with Hizbullah, Jumblatt may be shielding his community from internal maneuvers designed to protect supply lines and communications networks in the event of another Israel-Hizbullah war. Hizbullah’s channels, linking the Bekaa Valley with South Lebanon, traverse areas near Jumblatt’s own mountain stronghold and the party will certainly go to great lengths – as it did in May 2008 – to protect its infrastructure.
Third, Jumblatt had taken a backseat in the March 14 coalition and has acted to increase his political autonomy and influence.
Since inheriting his father’s political mantle in 2005, Future Movement leader Saad Hariri has gradually (and, at times, frustratingly) found his bearings. Quite simply, Hariri has not had to lean on Jumblatt for a while, and the latter ceased being the coalition’s driving force.
Nor was Jumblatt the coalition’s spearhead. March 14 Christians, particularly Lebanese Forces leader Samir Geagea, have increasingly assumed that role and gained Hariri’s ear over the past year. Of course, Jumblatt’s political gymnastics made his allies trust him less and decreased his sway within the movement.
In short, Jumblatt sees more value as a wild card. But what does his shift mean for others?
As it stands now, Lebanese leaders have coalesced around three alignments: a pro-Western camp; a pro-Iranian camp; and a “centrist” camp influenced by Syria. These groups are not mutually exclusive and their relationship, mirroring the regional dynamic, will ebb and flow.
The United States and Saudi Arabia will continue to back Hariri, who leads the pro-Western camp, even if their relations with Syria thaw. Similarly, Iran will continue to support and bankroll the Hizbullah-led opposition. The “centrist” bloc’s actions will presumably depend on how the Asad regime positions itself in the region.
If Syria is serious about playing a constructive role in the Middle East, the situation in Lebanon might improve. Conversely, if Syria merely aims to buy time and extract concessions from the United States, then Lebanon will pay the price.
At the local level, Jumblatt’s move may encourage opposition figures to join the pro-Syrian bloc on some issues. For instance, Marada chief Suleiman Franjieh and Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri both have an interest in opposing privatization, stalling anti-corruption measures, and crafting a pro-Syrian foreign policy.
Such a shift, if it occurs, will not diminish the March 8 bloc’s power. Most Shiites support Hizbullah, which Iran supplies and funds; and former General Michel Aoun’s Free Patriotic Movement retains much support within the Christian community.
Even so, Jumblatt’s departure is not a disaster for the March 14 movement. Whatever happens, Hariri can still count on Jumblatt’s support. Realistically, the Druze leader cannot afford to alienate Sunnis any more than Shiites. After all, Sunnis are a dominant majority in the Middle East and Jumblatt’s own electoral survival depends on good relations with Sunnis in the Chouf.
Moreover, Hariri’s Future Movement may move closer to the Lebanese Forces and Phalange, at least in the near term. These parties embrace Lebanon’s liberal economic tradition, oppose Syrian interference in Lebanon, and are comfortable in calling for serious talks on Hizbullah’s arms. Though smaller, the surviving coalition is more cohesive than its predecessor.
As always, the Beik fascinates and exasperates. An opportunist with a flair for making extravagant and contradictory declarations, the man is neither consistent nor accountable.
In some regard, however, he must be thanked. Unabashedly committed to his own survival, and that of his community, Walid Jumblatt has revealed – once more – the truth at the heart of politics in Lebanon.
July 7, 2009
Daily Star Opinion Piece: Help Lebanon, Help Mideast Democracy
Please read this opinion article that I coauthored with a colleague at George Washington University Law School. The piece deals with U.S. assistance to Lebanon.
June 19, 2009
A Thorn Among Roses: Christian Disarray in Lebanon
Christian Concerns
"Three things matter to the Christians of Lebanon, and those of Zahle in particular: the Presidency, the Lebanese Armed Forces [LAF], and the Church," said Okab Sakr, a Shiite MP from the Zahle district, during a Thursday airing of Kalam al-Nass. These words are as true as ever, but the Christian community seems hell-bent on undermining the last pillars of its significance.
The Presidency
The President of the Republic is traditionally a Maronite Christian. Although the Taif Accord that ended the Lebanese Civil War transferred most executive power from the presidency to the Cabinet (headed by a Sunni Prime Minister), the president retains considerable esteem as the "head of state and the symbol of the nation's unity."
As modified by the Taif Amendments, the Constitution states that the president "shall safeguard the constitution and Lebanon's independence, unity, and territorial integrity." As a Christian leader, the president also retains influence grounded in the communal nature of Lebanese politics.
All in all, the presidency is imbued with a great deal of symbolic importance and a potential for great influence over politics in Lebanon. But translating potential into effectiveness requires communal support - in the form of a parliamentary coalition or a share in cabinet - for the president.
Over the past two decades Christian bickering has stripped the presidency of such support. In the 1990s, Syria exploited intra-Christian and inter-communal divisions to install two docile presidents. From 2005 until 2008, Christian political leaders failed to reach a consensus on who would replace the inept President Emile Lahoud. Discord led to a six-month-long presidential vaccuum and allowed other local and regional players to determine the course of the presidency.
President Michel Suleiman, former commander of the LAF, has not been able (he may not be willing, either) to carve out an autonomous popular base for himself. With no parliamentary coalition aligned with him, Suleiman will need to retain a 'swing bloc' of cabinet ministers if he is to play the role of internal arbiter envisioned in the Taif Accord. Unfortunately, the consensus president has come under attack.
Leading the charge is Free Patriotic Movement leader and former General Michel Aoun. After the 2005 parliamentary elections, Aoun found himself at the head of a coalition of 22 lawmakers. Other Christian figures like Lebanese Forces leader Samir Geagea and Phalange boss and former President Amin Gemayel did not want to see Aoun ascend to the presidency, especially because of his alliance with Hizbullah. The March 14 Sunni and Druze factions also feared or resented Aoun, and preferred a presidential void to Aoun as president.
For his part, Aoun allowed his lust for the power to cloud his political vision: rather than act as kingmaker and facilitate the election of a consensus president, Aoun clung to his delusions. Like his Christian counterparts in the March 14 coalition, Aoun eventually saw himself sidelined within his political alliance when Hizbullah's interests favored electing a consensus president. The President was delivered over the heads of rival Christian factions.
Thus, despite his best efforts, Sleiman lacks institutional or popular bases for playing an effective role in the country.
A March 14 victory at the polls has only thrown the president's role into question. First, the March 14-March 8 divide polarized the elections and prevented a third bloc from emerging in support of Sleiman. Second, the March 14 victory means that the international community will not have to engage with the president as an alternative to a Hizbullah-led cabinet.
Of course, the president commands the respect of the army and has increasingly turned to the United States to strengthen the state institutions that he embodies. Strangely enough, a Lebanese President lacking an autonomous Christian base has strong support from the international community and Lebanese Muslims. Negotiations over the next cabinet will determine to what extent Sleiman can use this support to bolster his domestic role, but the presidency remains relatively marginalized within the Christian community for now, and this in turn has marginalized the community in Lebanon's system.
The Lebanese Armed Forces
The commander of the Lebanese Armed Forces is also traditionally Maronite, although decisions of war and peace do not rest with either with the commander or the president (the cabinet, collectively, must decide such matters).
The army is the most compelling example of cross-communal national unity in Lebanon. The institution draws members from all sects and regions, and Lebanon's various political bosses - despite several moments of dissatisfaction with particular actions - have yet to openly challenge its role in Lebanon since the withdrawal of Syrian troops in 2005.
Within the Christian community, the army receives almost exalted treatment. As a national institution, the LAF stands as a symbol the state of Lebanon, the "final homeland for all its citizens." On the other hand, as an institution commanded by a Christian, the LAF symbolizes the "enduring presence of Christians in Lebanon."
In doing so, the LAF somehow manages to satisfy two traditional - and sometimes conflicting - currents of Christian political thought: the narrow Christian desire for relevance in Lebanese political life and the broader Christian ambition of a Lebanese nation-state set apart from the region.
Brigadier-General Jean Kahwaji has replaced Suleiman as LAF commander, and has moved to preserve the international relationships built by Suleiman and Defense Minister Elias Murr, while attempting to retain the military's trust that Suleiman earned as a commander not too prone to either Western or Syrian interference.
Seeking training and material support from the West while maintaining a nationalist posture is a delicate task, but the LAF and its command staff have thus far managed to walk that line. As of yet, the LAF is a strong source of Christian unity and of Lebanese national sentiment.
Fortunately, no Christian leader appears set to consciously derail progress on this front. Unfortunately, political division continues to shackle the LAF's ability to make progress on strategic and operational fronts. Lacking a comprehensive defense policy or any sort of political cohesion regarding threats to the state, Lebanese military commanders have refrained from developing a strategic vision or tactical implementation.
The Christian rift in Lebanon has, on the one hand, weakened decision-making in the cabinet and, on the other hand, lent cross-communal support for Hizbullah. The consequences of this domestic division will continue to hold back the LAF, irrespective of international efforts to support the army's capabilities.
The Church
The Maronite Church is a Uniate Church, which means that the it is Catholic with regard to dogma and follows the Vatican, but retains an Eastern Syriac (Aramaic) liturgy and some institutional autonomy. The Maronite Patriarch is actually elected by a Conclave of Maronite Bishops and is "recognized" - rather than "appointed" - by the Pope.
The Church has played an important role in the history of Mount Lebanon and, since 1920, the successor Grand Liban and Republic of Lebanon. The Church was active in establishing an autonomous Lebanese state; nurturing "Lebanism" (Lebanese nationalism, rather than pan-Syrianism or Arabism) since the mid-19th century, and in expressing Lebanese Christian concerns in the absence of effective political leadership.
During the aftermath of the Lebanese Civil War in 1990, with Free Patriotic Movement leader General Michel Aoun in exile and Lebanese Forces chief Samir Geagea imprisoned, Maronite Patriarch Nasrallah Butros Sfeir led domestic opposition to Syria's post-war occupation of Lebanon. Other Lebanese figures and factions - particularly Hizbullah - have criticized the Patriarch for not adopting a more hostile stance towards Israel's of South Lebanon, which ended in 2000.
Nevertheless, the Patriarch commands the respect of broad swathes of Lebanese society, and stands as a symbol of the Christian conscience. After the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafic Hariri triggered mass demonstrations calling for Syria's withdrawal from Lebanon, the Patriarch's stances have seemed congruent with the March 14 coalition.
Most recently, Sfeir has come under fire from Nasrallah and Aoun for issuing an election-eve statement cautioning the Lebanese against "mistakes" that would likely ensue in the event of a Hizbullah victory, which would threaten "Lebanon's existence and its Arab identity."
Anyone - a patriarch, priest, or pundit - who makes a political statement should be ready to accept the reactions and criticisms of others. Furthermore, the Patriarch must be careful not to further alienate Aoun and Marada Movement leader Suleiman Franjieh, as they will be necessary to any intra-Christian reconciliation.
That being said, few religious clerics in Lebanon are subject to the same criticism from within or without their communities. For example, Ayatollah Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah does not draw the same ire for his relatively moderate stances regarding politics, society in Lebanon, or the role and rights of women.
More relevantly, Sayyed Nasrallah himself seems to be above criticism. For example, two years ago, Hizbullah supporters took to the streets to voice their rage at a satire show's depiction of Nasrallah. The Sayyed then announced to the rest of the Lebanese that, in Lebanon's pluralistic framework, people must be aware that "certain communities and cultures do not accept what others view as permissible."
A religious cleric who heads an Islamist party may thus use his cloak to place himself above questioning, while a Catholic cardinal and Patriarch must answer to others for his political commentary. This is not to say that the Patriarch should be immune from criticism (all individuals should bear the consequences of their speech and actions), but only to highlight the double standard that applies to Hizbullah.
Nevertheless, the fault here is not Hizbullah's. Other communities have shielded their religious leaders from mudslinging, but Christian politicians more readily criticize and even attack their own. In some regards, this is healthy: members of the Christian community can and often readily disagree with political leaders, spiritual guides, and each other. In the communal game, however, pluralism often leads to counterproductive fragmentation. A proper balance between criticism and respect is simply lacking in the Christian community.
Thorn Among Roses
In 1510, Pope Leo X addressed a papal bull to the Maronite Patriarch, Peter of Hadath, and described the Maronites as a "rose among thorns." Divided amongst themselves despite common trials and tribulations, Christians continue to leverage and undermine the presidency and patriarchate whilst bemoaning the "communal immunity" of their Lebanese counterparts. Alas, the Christians of Lebanon seem determined to become thorns among roses.
"Three things matter to the Christians of Lebanon, and those of Zahle in particular: the Presidency, the Lebanese Armed Forces [LAF], and the Church," said Okab Sakr, a Shiite MP from the Zahle district, during a Thursday airing of Kalam al-Nass. These words are as true as ever, but the Christian community seems hell-bent on undermining the last pillars of its significance.
The Presidency
The President of the Republic is traditionally a Maronite Christian. Although the Taif Accord that ended the Lebanese Civil War transferred most executive power from the presidency to the Cabinet (headed by a Sunni Prime Minister), the president retains considerable esteem as the "head of state and the symbol of the nation's unity."
As modified by the Taif Amendments, the Constitution states that the president "shall safeguard the constitution and Lebanon's independence, unity, and territorial integrity." As a Christian leader, the president also retains influence grounded in the communal nature of Lebanese politics.
All in all, the presidency is imbued with a great deal of symbolic importance and a potential for great influence over politics in Lebanon. But translating potential into effectiveness requires communal support - in the form of a parliamentary coalition or a share in cabinet - for the president.
Over the past two decades Christian bickering has stripped the presidency of such support. In the 1990s, Syria exploited intra-Christian and inter-communal divisions to install two docile presidents. From 2005 until 2008, Christian political leaders failed to reach a consensus on who would replace the inept President Emile Lahoud. Discord led to a six-month-long presidential vaccuum and allowed other local and regional players to determine the course of the presidency.
President Michel Suleiman, former commander of the LAF, has not been able (he may not be willing, either) to carve out an autonomous popular base for himself. With no parliamentary coalition aligned with him, Suleiman will need to retain a 'swing bloc' of cabinet ministers if he is to play the role of internal arbiter envisioned in the Taif Accord. Unfortunately, the consensus president has come under attack.
Leading the charge is Free Patriotic Movement leader and former General Michel Aoun. After the 2005 parliamentary elections, Aoun found himself at the head of a coalition of 22 lawmakers. Other Christian figures like Lebanese Forces leader Samir Geagea and Phalange boss and former President Amin Gemayel did not want to see Aoun ascend to the presidency, especially because of his alliance with Hizbullah. The March 14 Sunni and Druze factions also feared or resented Aoun, and preferred a presidential void to Aoun as president.
For his part, Aoun allowed his lust for the power to cloud his political vision: rather than act as kingmaker and facilitate the election of a consensus president, Aoun clung to his delusions. Like his Christian counterparts in the March 14 coalition, Aoun eventually saw himself sidelined within his political alliance when Hizbullah's interests favored electing a consensus president. The President was delivered over the heads of rival Christian factions.
Thus, despite his best efforts, Sleiman lacks institutional or popular bases for playing an effective role in the country.
A March 14 victory at the polls has only thrown the president's role into question. First, the March 14-March 8 divide polarized the elections and prevented a third bloc from emerging in support of Sleiman. Second, the March 14 victory means that the international community will not have to engage with the president as an alternative to a Hizbullah-led cabinet.
Of course, the president commands the respect of the army and has increasingly turned to the United States to strengthen the state institutions that he embodies. Strangely enough, a Lebanese President lacking an autonomous Christian base has strong support from the international community and Lebanese Muslims. Negotiations over the next cabinet will determine to what extent Sleiman can use this support to bolster his domestic role, but the presidency remains relatively marginalized within the Christian community for now, and this in turn has marginalized the community in Lebanon's system.
The Lebanese Armed Forces
The commander of the Lebanese Armed Forces is also traditionally Maronite, although decisions of war and peace do not rest with either with the commander or the president (the cabinet, collectively, must decide such matters).
The army is the most compelling example of cross-communal national unity in Lebanon. The institution draws members from all sects and regions, and Lebanon's various political bosses - despite several moments of dissatisfaction with particular actions - have yet to openly challenge its role in Lebanon since the withdrawal of Syrian troops in 2005.
Within the Christian community, the army receives almost exalted treatment. As a national institution, the LAF stands as a symbol the state of Lebanon, the "final homeland for all its citizens." On the other hand, as an institution commanded by a Christian, the LAF symbolizes the "enduring presence of Christians in Lebanon."
In doing so, the LAF somehow manages to satisfy two traditional - and sometimes conflicting - currents of Christian political thought: the narrow Christian desire for relevance in Lebanese political life and the broader Christian ambition of a Lebanese nation-state set apart from the region.
Brigadier-General Jean Kahwaji has replaced Suleiman as LAF commander, and has moved to preserve the international relationships built by Suleiman and Defense Minister Elias Murr, while attempting to retain the military's trust that Suleiman earned as a commander not too prone to either Western or Syrian interference.
Seeking training and material support from the West while maintaining a nationalist posture is a delicate task, but the LAF and its command staff have thus far managed to walk that line. As of yet, the LAF is a strong source of Christian unity and of Lebanese national sentiment.
Fortunately, no Christian leader appears set to consciously derail progress on this front. Unfortunately, political division continues to shackle the LAF's ability to make progress on strategic and operational fronts. Lacking a comprehensive defense policy or any sort of political cohesion regarding threats to the state, Lebanese military commanders have refrained from developing a strategic vision or tactical implementation.
The Christian rift in Lebanon has, on the one hand, weakened decision-making in the cabinet and, on the other hand, lent cross-communal support for Hizbullah. The consequences of this domestic division will continue to hold back the LAF, irrespective of international efforts to support the army's capabilities.
The Church
The Maronite Church is a Uniate Church, which means that the it is Catholic with regard to dogma and follows the Vatican, but retains an Eastern Syriac (Aramaic) liturgy and some institutional autonomy. The Maronite Patriarch is actually elected by a Conclave of Maronite Bishops and is "recognized" - rather than "appointed" - by the Pope.
The Church has played an important role in the history of Mount Lebanon and, since 1920, the successor Grand Liban and Republic of Lebanon. The Church was active in establishing an autonomous Lebanese state; nurturing "Lebanism" (Lebanese nationalism, rather than pan-Syrianism or Arabism) since the mid-19th century, and in expressing Lebanese Christian concerns in the absence of effective political leadership.
During the aftermath of the Lebanese Civil War in 1990, with Free Patriotic Movement leader General Michel Aoun in exile and Lebanese Forces chief Samir Geagea imprisoned, Maronite Patriarch Nasrallah Butros Sfeir led domestic opposition to Syria's post-war occupation of Lebanon. Other Lebanese figures and factions - particularly Hizbullah - have criticized the Patriarch for not adopting a more hostile stance towards Israel's of South Lebanon, which ended in 2000.
Nevertheless, the Patriarch commands the respect of broad swathes of Lebanese society, and stands as a symbol of the Christian conscience. After the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafic Hariri triggered mass demonstrations calling for Syria's withdrawal from Lebanon, the Patriarch's stances have seemed congruent with the March 14 coalition.
Most recently, Sfeir has come under fire from Nasrallah and Aoun for issuing an election-eve statement cautioning the Lebanese against "mistakes" that would likely ensue in the event of a Hizbullah victory, which would threaten "Lebanon's existence and its Arab identity."
Anyone - a patriarch, priest, or pundit - who makes a political statement should be ready to accept the reactions and criticisms of others. Furthermore, the Patriarch must be careful not to further alienate Aoun and Marada Movement leader Suleiman Franjieh, as they will be necessary to any intra-Christian reconciliation.
That being said, few religious clerics in Lebanon are subject to the same criticism from within or without their communities. For example, Ayatollah Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah does not draw the same ire for his relatively moderate stances regarding politics, society in Lebanon, or the role and rights of women.
More relevantly, Sayyed Nasrallah himself seems to be above criticism. For example, two years ago, Hizbullah supporters took to the streets to voice their rage at a satire show's depiction of Nasrallah. The Sayyed then announced to the rest of the Lebanese that, in Lebanon's pluralistic framework, people must be aware that "certain communities and cultures do not accept what others view as permissible."
A religious cleric who heads an Islamist party may thus use his cloak to place himself above questioning, while a Catholic cardinal and Patriarch must answer to others for his political commentary. This is not to say that the Patriarch should be immune from criticism (all individuals should bear the consequences of their speech and actions), but only to highlight the double standard that applies to Hizbullah.
Nevertheless, the fault here is not Hizbullah's. Other communities have shielded their religious leaders from mudslinging, but Christian politicians more readily criticize and even attack their own. In some regards, this is healthy: members of the Christian community can and often readily disagree with political leaders, spiritual guides, and each other. In the communal game, however, pluralism often leads to counterproductive fragmentation. A proper balance between criticism and respect is simply lacking in the Christian community.
Thorn Among Roses
In 1510, Pope Leo X addressed a papal bull to the Maronite Patriarch, Peter of Hadath, and described the Maronites as a "rose among thorns." Divided amongst themselves despite common trials and tribulations, Christians continue to leverage and undermine the presidency and patriarchate whilst bemoaning the "communal immunity" of their Lebanese counterparts. Alas, the Christians of Lebanon seem determined to become thorns among roses.
June 9, 2009
Silencing the Alarmists: Why The Conventional Wisdom Was Wrong
Lebanon's elections have surprised many observers. Few expected a victory by the March 14 coalition, and fewer still anticipated an expanded parliamentary majority. Despite a conventional wisdom that all but conceded a Hizbullah-led opposition victory, a group of Washington-based Lebanon analysts predicted a 'March 14' victory in successive analyses conducted over a two-month period leading up to the elections. Although each prediction run yielded different results (ranging from 64 'March 14' seats to 67 'March 14' seats), all signs pointed to a slight victory by the Western-backed coalition.
But confidence was low. The electoral law agreed upon in last year's Doha Accord clearly favored the 'March 8' opposition bloc. Indeed, Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) leader and former General Michel Aoun had repeatedly lauded his push for the law as a liberation of the 'Christian voice.'
Additionally, Hizbullah, Amal, the FPM, and the Tashnag had done a far better job of coordinating their electoral machines and in putting together candidacy lists (the sole exception was Jezzine, but the opposition was certain to capture the district regardless of whether the FPM and Amal were able to consolidate their competing lists).
The March 14 coalition also failed to effectively fly expatriate voters into Lebanon. Although it appears that both camps managed to arrange an influx of voters to accompany the regular turnout of 'political tourists,' a dispute between the Lebanese Forces and the Future Movement over the Armenian seat in the Beirut I district apparently scuttled plans for a harmonized pro-government campaign to bring the diaspora vote home.
Finally, even the policy community in Washington and Western-leaning analysts in Beirut agreed with their counterparts in Damascus, Tehran, and Tel Aviv that Lebanon would tilt towards the opposition. Of course, Lebanon's pluralism generally prevents drastic shifts in one direction or the other, but the broader regional trend seemingly pointed to a Hizbullah-FPM victory.
With Hamas in the Palestinian territories, the radical Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in Tehran, and a right-wing coalition in Israel, there was little hope for a coalition amiable to the West.
With pressing matters at home, argued rejectionists in Lebanon and Syria, the United States would soon withdraw its support for allies in the region and recede from overt involvement in the Middle East, as it had done decades earlier. As such, it would be prudent to align with Syria and Iran.
In Washington, alarmists argued that the rising tide of extremism would swallow Lebanon, particularly since Hizbullah humiliated the March 14 coalition in street battles last May and exposed the limits of American support.
While not false, these lines of reasoning missed the point. The communal fundamentals of Lebanese politics indicated that March 14 would capture seats in Koura, Metn, and Zahle (though nobody expected a sweep of Zahle's seven seats); the overall frustration of Lebanon's Christian conscience; and Hizbullah's tenuous domestic position, were key factors neglected by observers predicting a March 8 win.
In the grand scheme of things, not much has changed. Lebanon remains divided, the regional situation remains uncertain, and Hizbullah is still armed. Still, the alarmists were wrong about the election results. What remains to be seen is whether Lebanon has stemmed the expansion of Syrian and Iranian influence in a manner that will compell Damascus and Tehran to reassess and reengage.
But confidence was low. The electoral law agreed upon in last year's Doha Accord clearly favored the 'March 8' opposition bloc. Indeed, Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) leader and former General Michel Aoun had repeatedly lauded his push for the law as a liberation of the 'Christian voice.'
Additionally, Hizbullah, Amal, the FPM, and the Tashnag had done a far better job of coordinating their electoral machines and in putting together candidacy lists (the sole exception was Jezzine, but the opposition was certain to capture the district regardless of whether the FPM and Amal were able to consolidate their competing lists).
The March 14 coalition also failed to effectively fly expatriate voters into Lebanon. Although it appears that both camps managed to arrange an influx of voters to accompany the regular turnout of 'political tourists,' a dispute between the Lebanese Forces and the Future Movement over the Armenian seat in the Beirut I district apparently scuttled plans for a harmonized pro-government campaign to bring the diaspora vote home.
Finally, even the policy community in Washington and Western-leaning analysts in Beirut agreed with their counterparts in Damascus, Tehran, and Tel Aviv that Lebanon would tilt towards the opposition. Of course, Lebanon's pluralism generally prevents drastic shifts in one direction or the other, but the broader regional trend seemingly pointed to a Hizbullah-FPM victory.
With Hamas in the Palestinian territories, the radical Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in Tehran, and a right-wing coalition in Israel, there was little hope for a coalition amiable to the West.
With pressing matters at home, argued rejectionists in Lebanon and Syria, the United States would soon withdraw its support for allies in the region and recede from overt involvement in the Middle East, as it had done decades earlier. As such, it would be prudent to align with Syria and Iran.
In Washington, alarmists argued that the rising tide of extremism would swallow Lebanon, particularly since Hizbullah humiliated the March 14 coalition in street battles last May and exposed the limits of American support.
While not false, these lines of reasoning missed the point. The communal fundamentals of Lebanese politics indicated that March 14 would capture seats in Koura, Metn, and Zahle (though nobody expected a sweep of Zahle's seven seats); the overall frustration of Lebanon's Christian conscience; and Hizbullah's tenuous domestic position, were key factors neglected by observers predicting a March 8 win.
In the grand scheme of things, not much has changed. Lebanon remains divided, the regional situation remains uncertain, and Hizbullah is still armed. Still, the alarmists were wrong about the election results. What remains to be seen is whether Lebanon has stemmed the expansion of Syrian and Iranian influence in a manner that will compell Damascus and Tehran to reassess and reengage.
May 31, 2009
The Danger of Microphones: Empowering the Insane and Theatrical
"Stability in Lebanon should never be taken for granted," concludes a recent article on Lebanon in The Economist. Though the respected British weekly eloquently states the obvious - that the Lebanese state of affairs is as precarious as ever - Lebanon's rival factions continue to trade jabs over everything from political vision to the proper pronunciation of their respective names.
The venomous political discourse is not new, but this is precisely the problem: the Lebanese have become accustomed to vitriol - many even delight in it - and have failed themselves by not demanding more restraint from their leaders. In a recent interview on Kalam al-Nass, an influential political talk show, Walid Jumblatt said the following:
Of course, international and regional political considerations have contributed greatly to the instability in Lebanon. Because of its pluralistic society, Lebanon has long been open to the interests of other actors.
Nevertheless, the Lebanese political class has been a willing bedfellow, and its respective members have continued to leverage the interests of international patrons against their domestic rivals - such games are not new to Lebanon.
The Lebanese have yet to tire of their leaders, who are fighting for scraps in a country smaller than Connecticut while expecting the rest of the world to make Lebanon the linchpin of the international system. In all likelihood, the Lebanese have not tired because communal insecurity is a powerful incentive to lend unflinching support to one faction or another.
Yet, neither communal insecurity nor the system it has enshrined necessitates irresponsible leadership. Over the past few years, millions have taken to the streets in Lebanon. Peaceful, spontaneous protests have gradually made way to staged rallies, political posturing, and an incessant war of words that borders on the insane.
It should be stressed that the freedom of expression and freedom of assembly positively set Lebanon apart from many other countries in the region. It should also be stressed that the Syrian regime often stoked fears of instability in Lebanon to justify maintaining control over the country.
But, as the cliche goes, rights come with responsibilities. It is one thing to embrace honest, hard-fought political debate. It is quite another to accept reckless rhetoric that risks unleashing forces beyond the control of even the most capable of men.
The venomous political discourse is not new, but this is precisely the problem: the Lebanese have become accustomed to vitriol - many even delight in it - and have failed themselves by not demanding more restraint from their leaders. In a recent interview on Kalam al-Nass, an influential political talk show, Walid Jumblatt said the following:
"Do you know what the most dangerous weapon is? Along with nuclear weapons, microphones are the most dangerous of all. People - particularly in our East [that is, the Middle East] - throw caution to the wind when speaking in front of a microphone, as they play to their host or their audience."Coming from Jumblatt, a controversial figure who has often spoken and acted recklessly, this statement contains a powerful truth despite - or perhaps because of - its messenger: since the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafic Hariri, particularly since the July 2006 War completely exposed the fundamental differences within Lebanese society, careless words and irresponsible political acts have pushed Lebanon to the brink of another civil war time and again.
Of course, international and regional political considerations have contributed greatly to the instability in Lebanon. Because of its pluralistic society, Lebanon has long been open to the interests of other actors.
Nevertheless, the Lebanese political class has been a willing bedfellow, and its respective members have continued to leverage the interests of international patrons against their domestic rivals - such games are not new to Lebanon.
The Lebanese have yet to tire of their leaders, who are fighting for scraps in a country smaller than Connecticut while expecting the rest of the world to make Lebanon the linchpin of the international system. In all likelihood, the Lebanese have not tired because communal insecurity is a powerful incentive to lend unflinching support to one faction or another.
Yet, neither communal insecurity nor the system it has enshrined necessitates irresponsible leadership. Over the past few years, millions have taken to the streets in Lebanon. Peaceful, spontaneous protests have gradually made way to staged rallies, political posturing, and an incessant war of words that borders on the insane.
It should be stressed that the freedom of expression and freedom of assembly positively set Lebanon apart from many other countries in the region. It should also be stressed that the Syrian regime often stoked fears of instability in Lebanon to justify maintaining control over the country.
But, as the cliche goes, rights come with responsibilities. It is one thing to embrace honest, hard-fought political debate. It is quite another to accept reckless rhetoric that risks unleashing forces beyond the control of even the most capable of men.
April 2, 2008
The Daily Star (April 2, 2008): Moussa Report released by Arab League
This is a report overview written for The Daily Star:
Anthony Elghossain
Daily Star staff
BEIRUT: The past year has seen Lebanese politicians disagree with respect to the election of a president, the composition of a "national unity" government, and the drafting of a new electoral law, a new report issued by Arab League Secretary General Amr Moussa says.
Articles 157 through 184 of the report, which details the work of the Arab League over the past year, specifically address efforts to solve the Lebanese political crisis. The report describes the various trips taken by Moussa, the issues discussed with Lebanese leaders, and the formal stance of the Arab League regarding some of the differences within Lebanon.
The report notes that a three-point plan of action was drafted for Lebanon in November 2007. First, the plan called for "France, the Vatican, and other relevant nations to prevail on the Maronite patriarch [Nasrallah Butros Sfeir] to create a list of acceptable candidates for the presidency."
Second, the plan stated that this list was to be submitted to Future Movement chief MP Saad Hariri and Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri - representing the pro-government and opposition factions, respectively - in order to draft a short list to be presented to Parliament for voting.
Finally, the plan argued for "a French mediation role in convincing the patriarch to delineate his list and working with Syria and the Arab League" in driving a political compromise in Lebanon.
The report also mentions some of the concessions made by the feuding parties in Lebanon. One example was the agreement of former President Emile Lahoud to refrain from creating a government rivaling that of incumbent Prime Minister Fouad Siniora in exchange for a ruling majority concession that it would not elect a president by simple majority.
Moussa also says that it "soon became clear that the various parties preferred a controlled vacuum until agreement could be reached." In any case, as Lahoud's term expired and the transition to vacuum was completed, the Arab League proposed what is now known as the Arab initiative for Lebanon. This initiative, says the report, consists of three complementary principles designed to address the main issues of dispute in Lebanon.
The initiative calls for the immediate election of the commander of the Lebanese Armed Forces, General Michel Suleiman, as president, the formation of a national unity government fairly representing the ruling majority and opposition factions, and the drafting of a more representative electoral law.
Moussa said, "the Arab League was pleased with, and continues to endorse, the Lebanese consensus regarding the election of General Suleiman as president" but also notes that the dispute has since "focused on the distribution of seats within the next cabinet."
According to the report, efforts to resolve the dispute over government composition stalled as differing local interpretations of the second principle of the Arab initiative (forming a "national unity" government) were proposed by each faction.
The majority "favored a formula that granted it 14 seats, the opposition 6 seats, with the president controlling 10 seats." Conversely, the opposition argued that "the equal division of seats between the two factions and the presidency [10+10+10] was preferable."
While the report notes that interpretations range from pro-government 15+5+10 formulations to 10+10+10 opposition arrangements, it says that the Arab League would like to see a solution "granting the parliamentary majority a larger share of seats while preserving the voice of the opposition, perhaps along the lines of a 12/13 majority share, with the opposition taking 10 seats and the president receiving the remainder."
The report then focuses on the dispute over an electoral law, explaining that both Lebanese factions have agreed upon adopting a qada-based (smaller district) law. However, the Moussa report also says that "efforts to clarify the third principle of the Arab initiative [the electoral law] focused on forging agreement regarding the spirit of that law while leaving the specific formulation to Parliament and the government."
Since there remains a dispute over "what is meant by the qada as a unit" - whether or not the 1960 platform or a new one is adopted - and since the opposition and pro-government parties continue to quarrel over whether agreement over the electoral law must precede the implementation of the first two principles of the initiative (the report favors a sequential implementation), it appears that the political crisis may continue.
Anthony Elghossain
Daily Star staff
BEIRUT: The past year has seen Lebanese politicians disagree with respect to the election of a president, the composition of a "national unity" government, and the drafting of a new electoral law, a new report issued by Arab League Secretary General Amr Moussa says.
Articles 157 through 184 of the report, which details the work of the Arab League over the past year, specifically address efforts to solve the Lebanese political crisis. The report describes the various trips taken by Moussa, the issues discussed with Lebanese leaders, and the formal stance of the Arab League regarding some of the differences within Lebanon.
The report notes that a three-point plan of action was drafted for Lebanon in November 2007. First, the plan called for "France, the Vatican, and other relevant nations to prevail on the Maronite patriarch [Nasrallah Butros Sfeir] to create a list of acceptable candidates for the presidency."
Second, the plan stated that this list was to be submitted to Future Movement chief MP Saad Hariri and Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri - representing the pro-government and opposition factions, respectively - in order to draft a short list to be presented to Parliament for voting.
Finally, the plan argued for "a French mediation role in convincing the patriarch to delineate his list and working with Syria and the Arab League" in driving a political compromise in Lebanon.
The report also mentions some of the concessions made by the feuding parties in Lebanon. One example was the agreement of former President Emile Lahoud to refrain from creating a government rivaling that of incumbent Prime Minister Fouad Siniora in exchange for a ruling majority concession that it would not elect a president by simple majority.
Moussa also says that it "soon became clear that the various parties preferred a controlled vacuum until agreement could be reached." In any case, as Lahoud's term expired and the transition to vacuum was completed, the Arab League proposed what is now known as the Arab initiative for Lebanon. This initiative, says the report, consists of three complementary principles designed to address the main issues of dispute in Lebanon.
The initiative calls for the immediate election of the commander of the Lebanese Armed Forces, General Michel Suleiman, as president, the formation of a national unity government fairly representing the ruling majority and opposition factions, and the drafting of a more representative electoral law.
Moussa said, "the Arab League was pleased with, and continues to endorse, the Lebanese consensus regarding the election of General Suleiman as president" but also notes that the dispute has since "focused on the distribution of seats within the next cabinet."
According to the report, efforts to resolve the dispute over government composition stalled as differing local interpretations of the second principle of the Arab initiative (forming a "national unity" government) were proposed by each faction.
The majority "favored a formula that granted it 14 seats, the opposition 6 seats, with the president controlling 10 seats." Conversely, the opposition argued that "the equal division of seats between the two factions and the presidency [10+10+10] was preferable."
While the report notes that interpretations range from pro-government 15+5+10 formulations to 10+10+10 opposition arrangements, it says that the Arab League would like to see a solution "granting the parliamentary majority a larger share of seats while preserving the voice of the opposition, perhaps along the lines of a 12/13 majority share, with the opposition taking 10 seats and the president receiving the remainder."
The report then focuses on the dispute over an electoral law, explaining that both Lebanese factions have agreed upon adopting a qada-based (smaller district) law. However, the Moussa report also says that "efforts to clarify the third principle of the Arab initiative [the electoral law] focused on forging agreement regarding the spirit of that law while leaving the specific formulation to Parliament and the government."
Since there remains a dispute over "what is meant by the qada as a unit" - whether or not the 1960 platform or a new one is adopted - and since the opposition and pro-government parties continue to quarrel over whether agreement over the electoral law must precede the implementation of the first two principles of the initiative (the report favors a sequential implementation), it appears that the political crisis may continue.
March 25, 2008
The Daily Star: March 25, 2008
This is a newspiece written for The Daily Star:
Anthony Elghossain
Special to The Daily Star
BEIRUT: A Syrian government source denied that three Syrian Army divisions have been deployed near the Lebanese border, according to a Sunday report on Al-Manar TV. "Such reports are groundless and are better not be commented on," the Syrian source told the television channel.
The Sunday edition of An-Nahar newspaper, without specifying further, included a report claiming that "high-ranking" sources had informed the paper of the concurrent deployment of Syrian troops near the border and mobilization of certain Palestinian factions in the Lebanese Bekaa region.
Syrian troops withdrew from Lebanon in 2005 after a controversial 30-year presence, and their movements near the Lebanese-Syrian border, which has yet to be formally delineated, have remained a point of contention between the two states.
Various reports regarding the potential violation of Lebanese territory by Syrian troops or Syrian-backed Palestinian factions have periodically surfaced, as have reports claiming that Syrian troops have yet to leave certain areas considered to be Lebanese.
The report comes amid speculation concerning a potential escalation in political tension after the March 29-30 Arab summit in Damascus and says that the An-Nahar source "links this deployment to Iranian and Syrian calculations, ones with regional implications. This movement may indicate that Iran and Syria are trying to avoid confrontations on their own soil by choosing an alternative arena of conflict."
"There are signals that whatever happens after the Arab summit at the end of this month will carry significant repercussions," added the source. However, the source quoted by Al-Manar ridiculed the notion of such a deployment.
When asked to comment on the report, a senior Lebanese Army source refused to confirm or deny its validity, telling The Daily Star on Monday: "I have no comment on the matter."
March 21, 2008
The Thinking Lebanese: April 28, 2007
This is an old entry from The Thinking Lebanese blog:
A Blind Assessment: Communal Perspectives and Political Conjecture
The kidnapping saga involving Ziad Qabalan and Ziad Ghandour has come to a catastrophic end as their dead bodies were discovered yesterday in the Shouf region. This tragedy immediately acquired political overtones, perhaps inevitably, because of the timing and individuals concerned. It is rumored that Qabalan, a Sunni Muslim, was abducted in response to the killing of Adnan Shamas, a Shi'ite Muslim youth, during the clashes that occurred in and around Beirut Arab University on January 25th. Fears of retaliation have resulted in repeated calls for calm by leaders from both political camps, and while this is reassuring, the path forward is perhaps already slipping away. That is, control of the situation – and whether or not sustained violence occurs – is gradually escaping our political leadership.That is not to say that the collective efforts of the main players within the domestic arena could not significantly reduce the potential for civil strife by ending the political stalemate that has caused this national malaise. A stable domestic situation would significantly reduce the effects of marginal extremists (or external actors, for that matter) by alleviating tribalistic insecurities that make it so easy to manipulate communal interaction in Lebanon. Within the existing political balance however, the zu'ama are slowly being drained of their capacity to control and direct their incited followers. Lebanon is gradually approaching that crucial threshold where the zu'ama, in order to salvage their political livelihoods, finally bend to the will of the people.It matters not who committed these crimes, but who is perceived to have done so. The potential for conflict initiated by renegade groups is precisely why the leaders of March 14th and March 8th must return to the negotiating table. Even if – and the past months have illustrated this – there is no desire (or autonomous capacity) to resolve the internal aspects of the multifaceted stand-off in Lebanon, there should be a realization that conflict, at this point in time, will likely prove catastrophic to the goals of each camp in the near term.The March 14th camp surely realizes that violence will further damage the post-2005 political platform that has dominated its public stance: government reform, moves towards economic prosperity, resisting the Iranian agenda in the Near East, and pressuring the Syrian regime in the international arena (ostensibly to reduce overt political interference in Lebanese affairs). The parties that form this coalition also stand to lose if conflict ensues:
A Blind Assessment: Communal Perspectives and Political Conjecture
The kidnapping saga involving Ziad Qabalan and Ziad Ghandour has come to a catastrophic end as their dead bodies were discovered yesterday in the Shouf region. This tragedy immediately acquired political overtones, perhaps inevitably, because of the timing and individuals concerned. It is rumored that Qabalan, a Sunni Muslim, was abducted in response to the killing of Adnan Shamas, a Shi'ite Muslim youth, during the clashes that occurred in and around Beirut Arab University on January 25th. Fears of retaliation have resulted in repeated calls for calm by leaders from both political camps, and while this is reassuring, the path forward is perhaps already slipping away. That is, control of the situation – and whether or not sustained violence occurs – is gradually escaping our political leadership.That is not to say that the collective efforts of the main players within the domestic arena could not significantly reduce the potential for civil strife by ending the political stalemate that has caused this national malaise. A stable domestic situation would significantly reduce the effects of marginal extremists (or external actors, for that matter) by alleviating tribalistic insecurities that make it so easy to manipulate communal interaction in Lebanon. Within the existing political balance however, the zu'ama are slowly being drained of their capacity to control and direct their incited followers. Lebanon is gradually approaching that crucial threshold where the zu'ama, in order to salvage their political livelihoods, finally bend to the will of the people.It matters not who committed these crimes, but who is perceived to have done so. The potential for conflict initiated by renegade groups is precisely why the leaders of March 14th and March 8th must return to the negotiating table. Even if – and the past months have illustrated this – there is no desire (or autonomous capacity) to resolve the internal aspects of the multifaceted stand-off in Lebanon, there should be a realization that conflict, at this point in time, will likely prove catastrophic to the goals of each camp in the near term.The March 14th camp surely realizes that violence will further damage the post-2005 political platform that has dominated its public stance: government reform, moves towards economic prosperity, resisting the Iranian agenda in the Near East, and pressuring the Syrian regime in the international arena (ostensibly to reduce overt political interference in Lebanese affairs). The parties that form this coalition also stand to lose if conflict ensues:
- The Future Movement, led by Sa'ad Hariri, has championed its vision of Lebanon as a thriving commercial republic maintaining political neutrality (or perhaps, detached partisanship). Needless to say, this political vision, whether it is based on a coherent strategy for Lebanon or on a communal reaction to growing importance of the Shi'ite community in the Lebanese sphere, would be damaged by violent clashes that would (1) destroy what little politico-economic confidence is left in Lebanon and (2) draw the Sunni community into a conflict with a well-prepared adversary. We see then, that regardless of motivation, conflict is unfavorable at this stage.
- The Progressive Socialist Party (PSP) has an interest in resisting Syrian interference in Lebanon – if only because of the vociferous stance that its leader, Walid Jumblatt, has taken vis-à-vis the Ba'athist leadership. At a deeper level, it seems that the Druze community is in the process of converging with the Christians on broader issues relating to the political system in Lebanon and Lebanese foreign policy – this may perhaps be taken to be a result of, again, the growing role of the Shi'ite community. Socio-historical insecurities that long characterized relations between the Druze and Maronites may perhaps be shifting to encompass Druze-Shi'ite relations, especially if one parallels the growth in Shi'ite population and prominence with the phenomenon experienced by the Maronites in the 18th and 19th centuries.
- The Lebanese Forces party (LF), led by Samir Geagea, most certainly has a desire to oppose the reassertion of Syrian hegemony in Lebanon and – as with the Sunnis and Druze – most likely seeks peace as a prerequisite for a new 'Merchant Republic'. The LF, as well as the Future Movement and the PSP, has also sought to rebuild state institutions – whatever the motivation for this, it is clear that civil strife would undermine this goal. These goals would be threatened by sustained conflict in Lebanon, as would the goal of Christian consolidation. Let us take a tangent outlining the dilemma facing the Christian community, one that is essential to the resolution of the long-term effects of this stand-off. Contrary to appearances, the split between the LF and the Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) is not centered on a new divergence regarding Syrian interference in Lebanon – this remains anathema to most Christians. Instead, the current divisions within the Christian community are a result of two factors. Firstly, one must consider the personal struggle between Geagea and Aoun for supremacy, for communal leadership. However, this struggle is rooted in a fundamental divergence regarding the projection of Christian interests within Lebanon and the region. Perhaps this has been arrived at unintentionally, but the split seems to reflect a serious dilemma for the Christian community as a whole: Is it preferable to (A) enter into alliance with the Sunni and Druze communities in order to preserve the sectarian system as it currently exists, more or less, and once again counteract an expansion of the Shi'ite role, or (B) align with the Shi'ite community, arguably uniting the two largest communities within Lebanon and accelerating de-confessionalization? Whatever the intended aims of each camp, civil war would only – as in the past – polarize the Christian community as the prelude has already polarized its leadership.
We see then, that the broader goals of the March 14th camp, as well as the more particular goals of its constituent groups, can only be aided by the avoidance of prolonged conflict. This brings us to the March 8th coalition, which has stressed the importance of fighting corruption in government, guarding against Israeli aggression, and resisting the American agenda in the region. This has entailed opposing the Hariri tribunal as a project, as it has been viewed as a politicized attempt to pressure the Syrian regime. A review of the opposition parties reveals that violence also hampers their narrower goals:
- Hezbollah: while this party undoubtedly holds an advantage in military capability, it stands to lose out substantially in an internal conflict. Firstly, such a conflict would merely distract the party from its foreign policy goal of confronting Israel. Secondly, it is difficult to envision how Hezbollah would conduct a war in Lebanon – the potential for gain is limited, and the feasibility of consolidating gains (both territorial and institutional) is, for all practical purposes, negligible. Of course, this neglects the political disaster that the organization would be confronted with: war, in the long-term, would likely damage the remaining multi-communal acceptance that allows Hezbollah to remain effective in confronting Israel. Finally, the internal goals of the organization – enhancing Shi'ite contributions to the decision making process in Lebanon and ensuring a more equitable distribution of resources – could not possibly be advanced without some accommodation from other communities (and other parties within the Shi'ite sect), and it is difficult to envision how war could bring this about in the short-term.
- Of all parties involved, AMAL, led by Speaker of Parliament Nabih Berri, is perhaps the least capable of developing an autonomous platform. This is not to say that Berri is bound to the decisions taken by Hezbollah, but that AMAL cannot – at this juncture – distance itself from its current stance without absorbing a serious blow politically. Perhaps growing frustration with the current paralysis will grant Berri the political capital needed for a rapprochement with the March 14th camp.
- The FPM has largely maneuvered on the basis of two factors: opposition to the Hariri legacy (on the whole) and the attempted consolidation of Michel Aoun's position within the Christian community. Aoun has entertained presidential hopes since his return from exile, and at one point could have been considered as the first choice of most Christians, especially Maronites. Support for Aoun has since waned, as he has entered into opposition with Hezbollah and AMAL – this in itself is not as problematic as the manner in which his opposition has translated on the ground. The disturbances in January, combined with his being outmaneuvered by Geagea in the immediate political aftermath, have significantly reduced his direct support amongst Christians (he still benefits from reluctance on the part of many of his former supporters to endorse the LF).
Prospects of sustained violence, it would seem, have no potential to yield substantial gains to any of the parties involved. However, there should be serious worry that these parties will be drawn into the conflict that they should be seeking to avoid. One must wonder how capable these leaders are of restraining people should these sporadic disturbances continue – in fact, the more the leaders try, the more desensitized the population becomes. The opposition surely realizes this and will perhaps ease its stance, especially given the anticipation of conflict within a regional context. Indeed, one must wonder if both camps are biding their time. If this is indeed the case, then we can perhaps expect a return to negotiations soon. This will ease the danger of internal conflict, but should serve as a signal of expectation - the expectation of a regional solution one way or another. Whether this expectation is correct or not is another question best left open to debate.
The Thinking Lebanese: January 28, 2007
This is an old entry from The Thinking Lebanese blog:
Lebanon Unraveled
The turmoil in Lebanon this past week has created inherently contradictory sentiments amongst the broader population, especially those who support the March 14th movement. On the one hand, the rapid escalations witnessed on the 23rd (an FPM-LF confrontation) and the 25th (a confrontation between the Shiite opposition blocs and the Sunni-Druze wing of the March 14th coalition) have magnified the potential for explosive violence, despite the best intentions of political leaders on both sides of the divide. It is possible that this violence will spread, gradually engulfing this delicate country. That is, even if one assumes that neither side would like to see sporadic outbursts of violence, it is difficult to believe that these leaders are capable of completely controlling the situation. On the other hand, there is the sentiment that the events of the past week have created a sense of urgency in Lebanon, one that will drive leaders to another round of negotiations, as most parties lack the organized armed capability - and will - for sustained conflict (this may change if the situation continues to unravel).
Both these sentiments, as is often the case, are partial truths. The likelihood of violence has indeed been increased by the past week's turmoil, as tempers have flared and accusations slung at the levels of leadership and political supporters. More telling however, is the potential hijacking of mass gatherings by intelligence cells (American, Iranian, Israeli, and/or Syrian) and marginalized internal political groups which was the cause for most concern when this cycle of political demonstrations began in early December. Both camps - assuming that their readings indicate that violence is more harmful then beneficial - would be wise to note this potential domino effect and act to stabilize the political condition by returning to dialogue rather than providing ample room for the settlement of old scores, a microcosmic representation of regional conflicts (at the state level, but also at a sectarian level), and the interference of destabilizing actors to harm the political environment in Lebanon by corrupting an already volatile internal situation.
The opposition has little to gain from continuing these demonstrations, as Hezbollah and AMAL have further antagonized the Sunni Muslim population in Lebanon while the FPM has managed to alienate a considerable portion of the country's "unaffiliated" Christian bloc, as Michael Young (of the Daily Star) and many others have highlighted. Indeed, General Aoun was significantly outmaneuvered by Samir Geagea in the immediate aftermath of the street clashes, and the opposition movement as a whole is in a difficult bind after the attempted closures of public domain. If a rational calculus is applied to the current state of the conflict, then it would appear that the opposition's domestic interests would require a return to negotiations. Increasing representation is surely a legitimate demand, but one that should also be balanced with the right of an elected majority to govern for its given mandate. There are external considerations at play however, ones related to the American-Iranian front and the Syrian concern with the Hariri tribunal. Any agreement would surely have to account for these apparent factors, but is this possible?
The March 14th coalition should realize that some accommodation needs to be made concerning opposition demands. While it is nonsensical (see earlier posts) to claim that an opposition movement should be able to simultaneously hold (a) the Presidency, (b) the Speakership, and (c) veto power in cabinet, there could be an agreement regarding a March 14th-controlled caretaker government. This government could have a restricted mandate: namely, implementing uncontroversial reforms related to Paris III (i.e. streamlining bureaucracies and reforming some public utilities) while maintaining political order until new elections are held. Of course, this government would have to include FPM-controlled portfolios, and the most favorable solution would entail anyone of the myriad compromise formulas (19-9-2, 18-9-3, among others).
There are two apparent problems with this solution, from the government's perspective. Firstly, there is the question of the Hariri tribunal's viability - this is a core issue in any proposed solution. Secondly, there is the future of the Lebanese Presidency, which is specifically problematic in solutions entailing early elections. It is extremely unlikely that the ruling coalition will agree to a solution that could result in the stalling of the tribunal and/or the loss of the Parliamentary majority that is vital in electing the President (and of course, legitimizing the government).
Is political stability worth rushing into an international tribunal? It is doubtful that this is the case. The forceful stance adopted by the Siniora government is probably indicative of backroom assurances from Western powers and the majority of Arab states. The success of the Paris III donor conference surely supports this claim, which is hardly a secret in any case. On the other side of the equation, there is the stubborn stance of the opposition which is also indicative of external political support and a realization that for many - if not most - Lebanese, the international tribunal is not worth political stability (even if it is merely short-term stability). By opposing the rushed nature of the tribunal and not the tribunal itself, the opposition has been coaxing doubt in the minds of the Lebanese - many of whom believe that the tribunal is inevitable, and hence, not worth rushing into at the cost of turmoil. This completely destroys any rational solution. In effect, both sides are negotiating non-negotiable political variables at the external level, and are dressing up the debate as one concerned with internal political considerations (ones that could be solved within weeks if this was indeed the case). Even is one believes that the tribunal itself is merely a tool within a broader regional standoff, the same conclusion is at hand - external rifts have once again been fused to internal Lebanese issues to an extent that reduces these internal factors to secondary importance.
Saving Lebanon from the mess we have created will require a bold move from the March 14th camp: calling for elections in the framework outlined above. This has been debated by members on this blog (especially between Mr. Itani and myself), and the potential for opposition victory has been - naturally - at the root of our respective stances. It has been argued that, provided new laws are implemented to allow for fair and effective representation, the opposition has little to gain by new elections since Aoun has been steadily losing support since last summer and the Shiite bloc has no way of gaining more seats. In any case, the events of the past week have further alienated the crucial bloc of unattached Christians, most especially in Keserwan, Mount Lebanon, and Zahle. It would seem that any solution within the current political climate would necessarily cede a non-negotiable value of either camp, that the only real solution is a complete break - call for elections and lay your cards on the table. Our leaders are playing "not to lose" rather than attempting to win, and in the process are allowing the Lebanese to experience the greatest of losses: the destruction of internal stability and confidence, as well the loss of life.
March 20, 2008
The Thinking Lebanese: December 1, 2006
This is an old entry from The Thinking Lebanese Blog
ENDGAME
The dilemma facing the Lebanese community is as follows - the opposition bloc, consisting of Amal, Hezbollah, and the FPM has committed itself to demonstrations until the resignation of the government, while the March 14th coalition has (as discernable from comments made by Walid Jumblatt and PM Siniora) decided that the most agreeable response would be to simply whether the storm. The appearance of General Aoun at the mass rally today has practically eliminated the possibility of any rapprochment between March 14th and the FPM, the only opposition party which could have been reasonably expected to join the anti-Syrian camp.
The result is basically a staring contest, and can only be resolved by the capitulation of an antagonist, a revival of discussions at the national level, or violent encounters of a significant level. It is extremely unlikely that either of the first two possibilities would occur, especially considering the local and "foreign" actors involved and almost existential nature of the root problems involved - this means that our current dilemma can either result in violence or in the continued disruption of the Lebanese economic, social, and political environment. Some might argue that an extended paralysis may result in the gradual reduction of active participants in anti-government rallies, since an economic downturn would affect everyone involved. It is hard to imagine however, that Hezbollah and the FPM have not planned for this; perhaps demonstrators will be rotated to maintain large numbers, subsidized to ease the economic burden resulting from their absence from work and/or broader economic regression (Hezbollah has already demonstrated such capabilities and the FPM could reasonably decide to utilize profits from the floating of OTV shares, which amount to $3 million).
Even the most optimistic scenario possible would mean renewed confrontations within a matter of months - let us assume that the opposition indeed elects to rejoin government without further incident, and let us assume that the next year passes without a Hezbollah-Israel war and/or an American-Iranian war. What will happen when Parliament convenes in November to elect the President of the Republic? It is impossible to imagine that a pro-Syrian president will be elected by a Parliament in which 71 out of 128 members are staunch members of the March 14th bloc. This would mean that the Lebanese executive would be unified for the first time since the Shehab era (which is in itself arguable). After the first ballot, in which a two-thirds vote is needed to elect a president, a simple majority is enough to declare a winner - will March 14th simply ignore the opposition's wishes for a compromise candidate, as presently stated? If this indeed occurs, then the resumption of a crisis would seem eminent - the opposition would again feel the need to resort to demonstrations, since the approval of the Hariri tribunal could now pass through government unopposed (this is the optimistic scenario; consider if you will, the possibility of war before November). The current stalemate will most likely result in a crisis between now and this time next year - will violence (domestic or external) break the deadlock, or will the leadership, in Lebanese fashion, avoid eminent crisis now by patching-up the immediate causes of conflict without addressing the root of the problem confronting them?
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