Silencing the Alarmists: Why The Conventional Wisdom Was Wrong

Lebanon's elections have surprised many observers. Few expected a victory by the March 14 coalition, and fewer still anticipated an expanded parliamentary majority. Despite a conventional wisdom that all but conceded a Hizbullah-led opposition victory, a group of Washington-based Lebanon analysts predicted a 'March 14' victory in successive analyses conducted over a two-month period leading up to the elections. Although each prediction run yielded different results (ranging from 64 'March 14' seats to 67 'March 14' seats), all signs pointed to a slight victory by the Western-backed coalition.

But confidence was low. The electoral law agreed upon in last year's Doha Accord clearly favored the 'March 8' opposition bloc. Indeed, Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) leader and former General Michel Aoun had repeatedly lauded his push for the law as a liberation of the 'Christian voice.'

Additionally, Hizbullah, Amal, the FPM, and the Tashnag had done a far better job of coordinating their electoral machines and in putting together candidacy lists (the sole exception was Jezzine, but the opposition was certain to capture the district regardless of whether the FPM and Amal were able to consolidate their competing lists).

The March 14 coalition also failed to effectively fly expatriate voters into Lebanon. Although it appears that both camps managed to arrange an influx of voters to accompany the regular turnout of 'political tourists,' a dispute between the Lebanese Forces and the Future Movement over the Armenian seat in the Beirut I district apparently scuttled plans for a harmonized pro-government campaign to bring the diaspora vote home.

Finally, even the policy community in Washington and Western-leaning analysts in Beirut agreed with their counterparts in Damascus, Tehran, and Tel Aviv that Lebanon would tilt towards the opposition. Of course, Lebanon's pluralism generally prevents drastic shifts in one direction or the other, but the broader regional trend seemingly pointed to a Hizbullah-FPM victory.

With Hamas in the Palestinian territories, the radical Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in Tehran, and a right-wing coalition in Israel, there was little hope for a coalition amiable to the West.

With pressing matters at home, argued rejectionists in Lebanon and Syria, the United States would soon withdraw its support for allies in the region and recede from overt involvement in the Middle East, as it had done decades earlier. As such, it would be prudent to align with Syria and Iran.

In Washington, alarmists argued that the rising tide of extremism would swallow Lebanon, particularly since Hizbullah humiliated the March 14 coalition in street battles last May and exposed the limits of American support.

While not false, these lines of reasoning missed the point. The communal fundamentals of Lebanese politics indicated that March 14 would capture seats in Koura, Metn, and Zahle (though nobody expected a sweep of Zahle's seven seats); the overall frustration of Lebanon's Christian conscience; and Hizbullah's tenuous domestic position, were key factors neglected by observers predicting a March 8 win.

In the grand scheme of things, not much has changed. Lebanon remains divided, the regional situation remains uncertain, and Hizbullah is still armed. Still, the alarmists were wrong about the election results. What remains to be seen is whether Lebanon has stemmed the expansion of Syrian and Iranian influence in a manner that will compell Damascus and Tehran to reassess and reengage.