The Daily Star (April 2, 2008): Moussa Report released by Arab League

This is a report overview written for The Daily Star:

Anthony Elghossain
Daily Star staff

BEIRUT: The past year has seen Lebanese politicians disagree with respect to the election of a president, the composition of a "national unity" government, and the drafting of a new electoral law, a new report issued by Arab League Secretary General Amr Moussa says.

Articles 157 through 184 of the report, which details the work of the Arab League over the past year, specifically address efforts to solve the Lebanese political crisis. The report describes the various trips taken by Moussa, the issues discussed with Lebanese leaders, and the formal stance of the Arab League regarding some of the differences within Lebanon.

The report notes that a three-point plan of action was drafted for Lebanon in November 2007. First, the plan called for "France, the Vatican, and other relevant nations to prevail on the Maronite patriarch [Nasrallah Butros Sfeir] to create a list of acceptable candidates for the presidency."

Second, the plan stated that this list was to be submitted to Future Movement chief MP Saad Hariri and Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri - representing the pro-government and opposition factions, respectively - in order to draft a short list to be presented to Parliament for voting.

Finally, the plan argued for "a French mediation role in convincing the patriarch to delineate his list and working with Syria and the Arab League" in driving a political compromise in Lebanon.

The report also mentions some of the concessions made by the feuding parties in Lebanon. One example was the agreement of former President Emile Lahoud to refrain from creating a government rivaling that of incumbent Prime Minister Fouad Siniora in exchange for a ruling majority concession that it would not elect a president by simple majority.

Moussa also says that it "soon became clear that the various parties preferred a controlled vacuum until agreement could be reached." In any case, as Lahoud's term expired and the transition to vacuum was completed, the Arab League proposed what is now known as the Arab initiative for Lebanon. This initiative, says the report, consists of three complementary principles designed to address the main issues of dispute in Lebanon.

The initiative calls for the immediate election of the commander of the Lebanese Armed Forces, General Michel Suleiman, as president, the formation of a national unity government fairly representing the ruling majority and opposition factions, and the drafting of a more representative electoral law.

Moussa said, "the Arab League was pleased with, and continues to endorse, the Lebanese consensus regarding the election of General Suleiman as president" but also notes that the dispute has since "focused on the distribution of seats within the next cabinet."

According to the report, efforts to resolve the dispute over government composition stalled as differing local interpretations of the second principle of the Arab initiative (forming a "national unity" government) were proposed by each faction.

The majority "favored a formula that granted it 14 seats, the opposition 6 seats, with the president controlling 10 seats." Conversely, the opposition argued that "the equal division of seats between the two factions and the presidency [10+10+10] was preferable."

While the report notes that interpretations range from pro-government 15+5+10 formulations to 10+10+10 opposition arrangements, it says that the Arab League would like to see a solution "granting the parliamentary majority a larger share of seats while preserving the voice of the opposition, perhaps along the lines of a 12/13 majority share, with the opposition taking 10 seats and the president receiving the remainder."

The report then focuses on the dispute over an electoral law, explaining that both Lebanese factions have agreed upon adopting a qada-based (smaller district) law. However, the Moussa report also says that "efforts to clarify the third principle of the Arab initiative [the electoral law] focused on forging agreement regarding the spirit of that law while leaving the specific formulation to Parliament and the government."

Since there remains a dispute over "what is meant by the qada as a unit" - whether or not the 1960 platform or a new one is adopted - and since the opposition and pro-government parties continue to quarrel over whether agreement over the electoral law must precede the implementation of the first two principles of the initiative (the report favors a sequential implementation), it appears that the political crisis may continue.

The Daily Star: March 25, 2008

This is a newspiece written for The Daily Star:

Anthony Elghossain

Special to The Daily Star

BEIRUT: A Syrian government source denied that three Syrian Army divisions have been deployed near the Lebanese border, according to a Sunday report on Al-Manar TV. "Such reports are groundless and are better not be commented on," the Syrian source told the television channel.

The Sunday edition of An-Nahar newspaper, without specifying further, included a report claiming that "high-ranking" sources had informed the paper of the concurrent deployment of Syrian troops near the border and mobilization of certain Palestinian factions in the Lebanese Bekaa region.

Syrian troops withdrew from Lebanon in 2005 after a controversial 30-year presence, and their movements near the Lebanese-Syrian border, which has yet to be formally delineated, have remained a point of contention between the two states.

Various reports regarding the potential violation of Lebanese territory by Syrian troops or Syrian-backed Palestinian factions have periodically surfaced, as have reports claiming that Syrian troops have yet to leave certain areas considered to be Lebanese.

The report comes amid speculation concerning a potential escalation in political tension after the March 29-30 Arab summit in Damascus and says that the An-Nahar source "links this deployment to Iranian and Syrian calculations, ones with regional implications. This movement may indicate that Iran and Syria are trying to avoid confrontations on their own soil by choosing an alternative arena of conflict."

"There are signals that whatever happens after the Arab summit at the end of this month will carry significant repercussions," added the source. However, the source quoted by Al-Manar ridiculed the notion of such a deployment.

When asked to comment on the report, a senior Lebanese Army source refused to confirm or deny its validity, telling The Daily Star on Monday: "I have no comment on the matter."

The Thinking Lebanese: April 28, 2007

This is an old entry from The Thinking Lebanese blog:


A Blind Assessment: Communal Perspectives and Political Conjecture


The kidnapping saga involving Ziad Qabalan and Ziad Ghandour has come to a catastrophic end as their dead bodies were discovered yesterday in the Shouf region. This tragedy immediately acquired political overtones, perhaps inevitably, because of the timing and individuals concerned. It is rumored that Qabalan, a Sunni Muslim, was abducted in response to the killing of Adnan Shamas, a Shi'ite Muslim youth, during the clashes that occurred in and around Beirut Arab University on January 25th. Fears of retaliation have resulted in repeated calls for calm by leaders from both political camps, and while this is reassuring, the path forward is perhaps already slipping away. That is, control of the situation – and whether or not sustained violence occurs – is gradually escaping our political leadership.That is not to say that the collective efforts of the main players within the domestic arena could not significantly reduce the potential for civil strife by ending the political stalemate that has caused this national malaise. A stable domestic situation would significantly reduce the effects of marginal extremists (or external actors, for that matter) by alleviating tribalistic insecurities that make it so easy to manipulate communal interaction in Lebanon. Within the existing political balance however, the zu'ama are slowly being drained of their capacity to control and direct their incited followers. Lebanon is gradually approaching that crucial threshold where the zu'ama, in order to salvage their political livelihoods, finally bend to the will of the people.It matters not who committed these crimes, but who is perceived to have done so. The potential for conflict initiated by renegade groups is precisely why the leaders of March 14th and March 8th must return to the negotiating table. Even if – and the past months have illustrated this – there is no desire (or autonomous capacity) to resolve the internal aspects of the multifaceted stand-off in Lebanon, there should be a realization that conflict, at this point in time, will likely prove catastrophic to the goals of each camp in the near term.The March 14th camp surely realizes that violence will further damage the post-2005 political platform that has dominated its public stance: government reform, moves towards economic prosperity, resisting the Iranian agenda in the Near East, and pressuring the Syrian regime in the international arena (ostensibly to reduce overt political interference in Lebanese affairs). The parties that form this coalition also stand to lose if conflict ensues:

• The Future Movement, led by Sa'ad Hariri, has championed its vision of Lebanon as a thriving commercial republic maintaining political neutrality (or perhaps, detached partisanship). Needless to say, this political vision, whether it is based on a coherent strategy for Lebanon or on a communal reaction to growing importance of the Shi'ite community in the Lebanese sphere, would be damaged by violent clashes that would (1) destroy what little politico-economic confidence is left in Lebanon and (2) draw the Sunni community into a conflict with a well-prepared adversary. We see then, that regardless of motivation, conflict is unfavorable at this stage.

• The Progressive Socialist Party (PSP) has an interest in resisting Syrian interference in Lebanon – if only because of the vociferous stance that its leader, Walid Jumblatt, has taken vis-à-vis the Ba'athist leadership. At a deeper level, it seems that the Druze community is in the process of converging with the Christians on broader issues relating to the political system in Lebanon and Lebanese foreign policy – this may perhaps be taken to be a result of, again, the growing role of the Shi'ite community. Socio-historical insecurities that long characterized relations between the Druze and Maronites may perhaps be shifting to encompass Druze-Shi'ite relations, especially if one parallels the growth in Shi'ite population and prominence with the phenomenon experienced by the Maronites in the 18th and 19th centuries.

• The Lebanese Forces party (LF), led by Samir Geagea, most certainly has a desire to oppose the reassertion of Syrian hegemony in Lebanon and – as with the Sunnis and Druze – most likely seeks peace as a prerequisite for a new 'Merchant Republic'. The LF, as well as the Future Movement and the PSP, has also sought to rebuild state institutions – whatever the motivation for this, it is clear that civil strife would undermine this goal. These goals would be threatened by sustained conflict in Lebanon, as would the goal of Christian consolidation. Let us take a tangent outlining the dilemma facing the Christian community, one that is essential to the resolution of the long-term effects of this stand-off. Contrary to appearances, the split between the LF and the Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) is not centered on a new divergence regarding Syrian interference in Lebanon – this remains anathema to most Christians. Instead, the current divisions within the Christian community are a result of two factors. Firstly, one must consider the personal struggle between Geagea and Aoun for supremacy, for communal leadership. However, this struggle is rooted in a fundamental divergence regarding the projection of Christian interests within Lebanon and the region. Perhaps this has been arrived at unintentionally, but the split seems to reflect a serious dilemma for the Christian community as a whole: Is it preferable to (A) enter into alliance with the Sunni and Druze communities in order to preserve the sectarian system as it currently exists, more or less, and once again counteract an expansion of the Shi'ite role, or (B) align with the Shi'ite community, arguably uniting the two largest communities within Lebanon and accelerating de-confessionalization? Whatever the intended aims of each camp, civil war would only – as in the past – polarize the Christian community as the prelude has already polarized its leadership.

We see then, that the broader goals of the March 14th camp, as well as the more particular goals of its constituent groups, can only be aided by the avoidance of prolonged conflict. This brings us to the March 8th coalition, which has stressed the importance of fighting corruption in government, guarding against Israeli aggression, and resisting the American agenda in the region. This has entailed opposing the Hariri tribunal as a project, as it has been viewed as a politicized attempt to pressure the Syrian regime. A review of the opposition parties reveals that violence also hampers their narrower goals:

• Hezbollah: while this party undoubtedly holds an advantage in military capability, it stands to lose out substantially in an internal conflict. Firstly, such a conflict would merely distract the party from its foreign policy goal of confronting Israel. Secondly, it is difficult to envision how Hezbollah would conduct a war in Lebanon – the potential for gain is limited, and the feasibility of consolidating gains (both territorial and institutional) is, for all practical purposes, negligible. Of course, this neglects the political disaster that the organization would be confronted with: war, in the long-term, would likely damage the remaining multi-communal acceptance that allows Hezbollah to remain effective in confronting Israel. Finally, the internal goals of the organization – enhancing Shi'ite contributions to the decision making process in Lebanon and ensuring a more equitable distribution of resources – could not possibly be advanced without some accommodation from other communities (and other parties within the Shi'ite sect), and it is difficult to envision how war could bring this about in the short-term.

• Of all parties involved, AMAL, led by Speaker of Parliament Nabih Berri, is perhaps the least capable of developing an autonomous platform. This is not to say that Berri is bound to the decisions taken by Hezbollah, but that AMAL cannot – at this juncture – distance itself from its current stance without absorbing a serious blow politically. Perhaps growing frustration with the current paralysis will grant Berri the political capital needed for a rapprochement with the March 14th camp.

• The FPM has largely maneuvered on the basis of two factors: opposition to the Hariri legacy (on the whole) and the attempted consolidation of Michel Aoun's position within the Christian community. Aoun has entertained presidential hopes since his return from exile, and at one point could have been considered as the first choice of most Christians, especially Maronites. Support for Aoun has since waned, as he has entered into opposition with Hezbollah and AMAL – this in itself is not as problematic as the manner in which his opposition has translated on the ground. The disturbances in January, combined with his being outmaneuvered by Geagea in the immediate political aftermath, have significantly reduced his direct support amongst Christians (he still benefits from reluctance on the part of many of his former supporters to endorse the LF).

Prospects of sustained violence, it would seem, have no potential to yield substantial gains to any of the parties involved. However, there should be serious worry that these parties will be drawn into the conflict that they should be seeking to avoid. One must wonder how capable these leaders are of restraining people should these sporadic disturbances continue – in fact, the more the leaders try, the more desensitized the population becomes. The opposition surely realizes this and will perhaps ease its stance, especially given the anticipation of conflict within a regional context. Indeed, one must wonder if both camps are biding their time. If this is indeed the case, then we can perhaps expect a return to negotiations soon. This will ease the danger of internal conflict, but should serve as a signal of expectation - the expectation of a regional solution one way or another. Whether this expectation is correct or not is another question best left open to debate.

The Thinking Lebanese: January 28, 2007

This is an old entry from The Thinking Lebanese blog:

Lebanon Unraveled

The turmoil in Lebanon this past week has created inherently contradictory sentiments amongst the broader population, especially those who support the March 14th movement. On the one hand, the rapid escalations witnessed on the 23rd (an FPM-LF confrontation) and the 25th (a confrontation between the Shiite opposition blocs and the Sunni-Druze wing of the March 14th coalition) have magnified the potential for explosive violence, despite the best intentions of political leaders on both sides of the divide. It is possible that this violence will spread, gradually engulfing this delicate country. That is, even if one assumes that neither side would like to see sporadic outbursts of violence, it is difficult to believe that these leaders are capable of completely controlling the situation. On the other hand, there is the sentiment that the events of the past week have created a sense of urgency in Lebanon, one that will drive leaders to another round of negotiations, as most parties lack the organized armed capability - and will - for sustained conflict (this may change if the situation continues to unravel).

Both these sentiments, as is often the case, are partial truths. The likelihood of violence has indeed been increased by the past week's turmoil, as tempers have flared and accusations slung at the levels of leadership and political supporters. More telling however, is the potential hijacking of mass gatherings by intelligence cells (American, Iranian, Israeli, and/or Syrian) and marginalized internal political groups which was the cause for most concern when this cycle of political demonstrations began in early December. Both camps - assuming that their readings indicate that violence is more harmful then beneficial - would be wise to note this potential domino effect and act to stabilize the political condition by returning to dialogue rather than providing ample room for the settlement of old scores, a microcosmic representation of regional conflicts (at the state level, but also at a sectarian level), and the interference of destabilizing actors to harm the political environment in Lebanon by corrupting an already volatile internal situation.

The opposition has little to gain from continuing these demonstrations, as Hezbollah and AMAL have further antagonized the Sunni Muslim population in Lebanon while the FPM has managed to alienate a considerable portion of the country's "unaffiliated" Christian bloc, as Michael Young (of the Daily Star) and many others have highlighted. Indeed, General Aoun was significantly outmaneuvered by Samir Geagea in the immediate aftermath of the street clashes, and the opposition movement as a whole is in a difficult bind after the attempted closures of public domain. If a rational calculus is applied to the current state of the conflict, then it would appear that the opposition's domestic interests would require a return to negotiations. Increasing representation is surely a legitimate demand, but one that should also be balanced with the right of an elected majority to govern for its given mandate. There are external considerations at play however, ones related to the American-Iranian front and the Syrian concern with the Hariri tribunal. Any agreement would surely have to account for these apparent factors, but is this possible?

The March 14th coalition should realize that some accommodation needs to be made concerning opposition demands. While it is nonsensical (see earlier posts) to claim that an opposition movement should be able to simultaneously hold (a) the Presidency, (b) the Speakership, and (c) veto power in cabinet, there could be an agreement regarding a March 14th-controlled caretaker government. This government could have a restricted mandate: namely, implementing uncontroversial reforms related to Paris III (i.e. streamlining bureaucracies and reforming some public utilities) while maintaining political order until new elections are held. Of course, this government would have to include FPM-controlled portfolios, and the most favorable solution would entail anyone of the myriad compromise formulas (19-9-2, 18-9-3, among others).
There are two apparent problems with this solution, from the government's perspective. Firstly, there is the question of the Hariri tribunal's viability - this is a core issue in any proposed solution. Secondly, there is the future of the Lebanese Presidency, which is specifically problematic in solutions entailing early elections. It is extremely unlikely that the ruling coalition will agree to a solution that could result in the stalling of the tribunal and/or the loss of the Parliamentary majority that is vital in electing the President (and of course, legitimizing the government).

Is political stability worth rushing into an international tribunal? It is doubtful that this is the case. The forceful stance adopted by the Siniora government is probably indicative of backroom assurances from Western powers and the majority of Arab states. The success of the Paris III donor conference surely supports this claim, which is hardly a secret in any case. On the other side of the equation, there is the stubborn stance of the opposition which is also indicative of external political support and a realization that for many - if not most - Lebanese, the international tribunal is not worth political stability (even if it is merely short-term stability). By opposing the rushed nature of the tribunal and not the tribunal itself, the opposition has been coaxing doubt in the minds of the Lebanese - many of whom believe that the tribunal is inevitable, and hence, not worth rushing into at the cost of turmoil. This completely destroys any rational solution. In effect, both sides are negotiating non-negotiable political variables at the external level, and are dressing up the debate as one concerned with internal political considerations (ones that could be solved within weeks if this was indeed the case). Even is one believes that the tribunal itself is merely a tool within a broader regional standoff, the same conclusion is at hand - external rifts have once again been fused to internal Lebanese issues to an extent that reduces these internal factors to secondary importance.

Saving Lebanon from the mess we have created will require a bold move from the March 14th camp: calling for elections in the framework outlined above. This has been debated by members on this blog (especially between Mr. Itani and myself), and the potential for opposition victory has been - naturally - at the root of our respective stances. It has been argued that, provided new laws are implemented to allow for fair and effective representation, the opposition has little to gain by new elections since Aoun has been steadily losing support since last summer and the Shiite bloc has no way of gaining more seats. In any case, the events of the past week have further alienated the crucial bloc of unattached Christians, most especially in Keserwan, Mount Lebanon, and Zahle. It would seem that any solution within the current political climate would necessarily cede a non-negotiable value of either camp, that the only real solution is a complete break - call for elections and lay your cards on the table. Our leaders are playing "not to lose" rather than attempting to win, and in the process are allowing the Lebanese to experience the greatest of losses: the destruction of internal stability and confidence, as well the loss of life.

The Thinking Lebanese: December 1, 2006

This is an old entry from The Thinking Lebanese Blog

ENDGAME

The dilemma facing the Lebanese community is as follows - the opposition bloc, consisting of Amal, Hezbollah, and the FPM has committed itself to demonstrations until the resignation of the government, while the March 14th coalition has (as discernable from comments made by Walid Jumblatt and PM Siniora) decided that the most agreeable response would be to simply whether the storm. The appearance of General Aoun at the mass rally today has practically eliminated the possibility of any rapprochment between March 14th and the FPM, the only opposition party which could have been reasonably expected to join the anti-Syrian camp.

The result is basically a staring contest, and can only be resolved by the capitulation of an antagonist, a revival of discussions at the national level, or violent encounters of a significant level. It is extremely unlikely that either of the first two possibilities would occur, especially considering the local and "foreign" actors involved and almost existential nature of the root problems involved - this means that our current dilemma can either result in violence or in the continued disruption of the Lebanese economic, social, and political environment. Some might argue that an extended paralysis may result in the gradual reduction of active participants in anti-government rallies, since an economic downturn would affect everyone involved. It is hard to imagine however, that Hezbollah and the FPM have not planned for this; perhaps demonstrators will be rotated to maintain large numbers, subsidized to ease the economic burden resulting from their absence from work and/or broader economic regression (Hezbollah has already demonstrated such capabilities and the FPM could reasonably decide to utilize profits from the floating of OTV shares, which amount to $3 million).

Even the most optimistic scenario possible would mean renewed confrontations within a matter of months - let us assume that the opposition indeed elects to rejoin government without further incident, and let us assume that the next year passes without a Hezbollah-Israel war and/or an American-Iranian war. What will happen when Parliament convenes in November to elect the President of the Republic? It is impossible to imagine that a pro-Syrian president will be elected by a Parliament in which 71 out of 128 members are staunch members of the March 14th bloc. This would mean that the Lebanese executive would be unified for the first time since the Shehab era (which is in itself arguable). After the first ballot, in which a two-thirds vote is needed to elect a president, a simple majority is enough to declare a winner - will March 14th simply ignore the opposition's wishes for a compromise candidate, as presently stated? If this indeed occurs, then the resumption of a crisis would seem eminent - the opposition would again feel the need to resort to demonstrations, since the approval of the Hariri tribunal could now pass through government unopposed (this is the optimistic scenario; consider if you will, the possibility of war before November). The current stalemate will most likely result in a crisis between now and this time next year - will violence (domestic or external) break the deadlock, or will the leadership, in Lebanese fashion, avoid eminent crisis now by patching-up the immediate causes of conflict without addressing the root of the problem confronting them?