The Thinking Lebanese: January 28, 2007

This is an old entry from The Thinking Lebanese blog:

Lebanon Unraveled

The turmoil in Lebanon this past week has created inherently contradictory sentiments amongst the broader population, especially those who support the March 14th movement. On the one hand, the rapid escalations witnessed on the 23rd (an FPM-LF confrontation) and the 25th (a confrontation between the Shiite opposition blocs and the Sunni-Druze wing of the March 14th coalition) have magnified the potential for explosive violence, despite the best intentions of political leaders on both sides of the divide. It is possible that this violence will spread, gradually engulfing this delicate country. That is, even if one assumes that neither side would like to see sporadic outbursts of violence, it is difficult to believe that these leaders are capable of completely controlling the situation. On the other hand, there is the sentiment that the events of the past week have created a sense of urgency in Lebanon, one that will drive leaders to another round of negotiations, as most parties lack the organized armed capability - and will - for sustained conflict (this may change if the situation continues to unravel).

Both these sentiments, as is often the case, are partial truths. The likelihood of violence has indeed been increased by the past week's turmoil, as tempers have flared and accusations slung at the levels of leadership and political supporters. More telling however, is the potential hijacking of mass gatherings by intelligence cells (American, Iranian, Israeli, and/or Syrian) and marginalized internal political groups which was the cause for most concern when this cycle of political demonstrations began in early December. Both camps - assuming that their readings indicate that violence is more harmful then beneficial - would be wise to note this potential domino effect and act to stabilize the political condition by returning to dialogue rather than providing ample room for the settlement of old scores, a microcosmic representation of regional conflicts (at the state level, but also at a sectarian level), and the interference of destabilizing actors to harm the political environment in Lebanon by corrupting an already volatile internal situation.

The opposition has little to gain from continuing these demonstrations, as Hezbollah and AMAL have further antagonized the Sunni Muslim population in Lebanon while the FPM has managed to alienate a considerable portion of the country's "unaffiliated" Christian bloc, as Michael Young (of the Daily Star) and many others have highlighted. Indeed, General Aoun was significantly outmaneuvered by Samir Geagea in the immediate aftermath of the street clashes, and the opposition movement as a whole is in a difficult bind after the attempted closures of public domain. If a rational calculus is applied to the current state of the conflict, then it would appear that the opposition's domestic interests would require a return to negotiations. Increasing representation is surely a legitimate demand, but one that should also be balanced with the right of an elected majority to govern for its given mandate. There are external considerations at play however, ones related to the American-Iranian front and the Syrian concern with the Hariri tribunal. Any agreement would surely have to account for these apparent factors, but is this possible?

The March 14th coalition should realize that some accommodation needs to be made concerning opposition demands. While it is nonsensical (see earlier posts) to claim that an opposition movement should be able to simultaneously hold (a) the Presidency, (b) the Speakership, and (c) veto power in cabinet, there could be an agreement regarding a March 14th-controlled caretaker government. This government could have a restricted mandate: namely, implementing uncontroversial reforms related to Paris III (i.e. streamlining bureaucracies and reforming some public utilities) while maintaining political order until new elections are held. Of course, this government would have to include FPM-controlled portfolios, and the most favorable solution would entail anyone of the myriad compromise formulas (19-9-2, 18-9-3, among others).
There are two apparent problems with this solution, from the government's perspective. Firstly, there is the question of the Hariri tribunal's viability - this is a core issue in any proposed solution. Secondly, there is the future of the Lebanese Presidency, which is specifically problematic in solutions entailing early elections. It is extremely unlikely that the ruling coalition will agree to a solution that could result in the stalling of the tribunal and/or the loss of the Parliamentary majority that is vital in electing the President (and of course, legitimizing the government).

Is political stability worth rushing into an international tribunal? It is doubtful that this is the case. The forceful stance adopted by the Siniora government is probably indicative of backroom assurances from Western powers and the majority of Arab states. The success of the Paris III donor conference surely supports this claim, which is hardly a secret in any case. On the other side of the equation, there is the stubborn stance of the opposition which is also indicative of external political support and a realization that for many - if not most - Lebanese, the international tribunal is not worth political stability (even if it is merely short-term stability). By opposing the rushed nature of the tribunal and not the tribunal itself, the opposition has been coaxing doubt in the minds of the Lebanese - many of whom believe that the tribunal is inevitable, and hence, not worth rushing into at the cost of turmoil. This completely destroys any rational solution. In effect, both sides are negotiating non-negotiable political variables at the external level, and are dressing up the debate as one concerned with internal political considerations (ones that could be solved within weeks if this was indeed the case). Even is one believes that the tribunal itself is merely a tool within a broader regional standoff, the same conclusion is at hand - external rifts have once again been fused to internal Lebanese issues to an extent that reduces these internal factors to secondary importance.

Saving Lebanon from the mess we have created will require a bold move from the March 14th camp: calling for elections in the framework outlined above. This has been debated by members on this blog (especially between Mr. Itani and myself), and the potential for opposition victory has been - naturally - at the root of our respective stances. It has been argued that, provided new laws are implemented to allow for fair and effective representation, the opposition has little to gain by new elections since Aoun has been steadily losing support since last summer and the Shiite bloc has no way of gaining more seats. In any case, the events of the past week have further alienated the crucial bloc of unattached Christians, most especially in Keserwan, Mount Lebanon, and Zahle. It would seem that any solution within the current political climate would necessarily cede a non-negotiable value of either camp, that the only real solution is a complete break - call for elections and lay your cards on the table. Our leaders are playing "not to lose" rather than attempting to win, and in the process are allowing the Lebanese to experience the greatest of losses: the destruction of internal stability and confidence, as well the loss of life.