The Thinking Lebanese: December 1, 2006

This is an old entry from The Thinking Lebanese Blog

ENDGAME

The dilemma facing the Lebanese community is as follows - the opposition bloc, consisting of Amal, Hezbollah, and the FPM has committed itself to demonstrations until the resignation of the government, while the March 14th coalition has (as discernable from comments made by Walid Jumblatt and PM Siniora) decided that the most agreeable response would be to simply whether the storm. The appearance of General Aoun at the mass rally today has practically eliminated the possibility of any rapprochment between March 14th and the FPM, the only opposition party which could have been reasonably expected to join the anti-Syrian camp.

The result is basically a staring contest, and can only be resolved by the capitulation of an antagonist, a revival of discussions at the national level, or violent encounters of a significant level. It is extremely unlikely that either of the first two possibilities would occur, especially considering the local and "foreign" actors involved and almost existential nature of the root problems involved - this means that our current dilemma can either result in violence or in the continued disruption of the Lebanese economic, social, and political environment. Some might argue that an extended paralysis may result in the gradual reduction of active participants in anti-government rallies, since an economic downturn would affect everyone involved. It is hard to imagine however, that Hezbollah and the FPM have not planned for this; perhaps demonstrators will be rotated to maintain large numbers, subsidized to ease the economic burden resulting from their absence from work and/or broader economic regression (Hezbollah has already demonstrated such capabilities and the FPM could reasonably decide to utilize profits from the floating of OTV shares, which amount to $3 million).

Even the most optimistic scenario possible would mean renewed confrontations within a matter of months - let us assume that the opposition indeed elects to rejoin government without further incident, and let us assume that the next year passes without a Hezbollah-Israel war and/or an American-Iranian war. What will happen when Parliament convenes in November to elect the President of the Republic? It is impossible to imagine that a pro-Syrian president will be elected by a Parliament in which 71 out of 128 members are staunch members of the March 14th bloc. This would mean that the Lebanese executive would be unified for the first time since the Shehab era (which is in itself arguable). After the first ballot, in which a two-thirds vote is needed to elect a president, a simple majority is enough to declare a winner - will March 14th simply ignore the opposition's wishes for a compromise candidate, as presently stated? If this indeed occurs, then the resumption of a crisis would seem eminent - the opposition would again feel the need to resort to demonstrations, since the approval of the Hariri tribunal could now pass through government unopposed (this is the optimistic scenario; consider if you will, the possibility of war before November). The current stalemate will most likely result in a crisis between now and this time next year - will violence (domestic or external) break the deadlock, or will the leadership, in Lebanese fashion, avoid eminent crisis now by patching-up the immediate causes of conflict without addressing the root of the problem confronting them?